And rightfully so! Keeping PH as it is would certainly not be ASB or even unrealistic, while changing it would mean a loss of focus on what this story is actually about.
Malaya What If
- Thread starter Fatboy Coxy
- Start date
This is excactly how it should be seen in (militairy) history. In matter of fact the whole attack on the 7th and 8th, also in Asia, must be seen as a magnificent military undertaking seen from military perspective. An attack over sheer distances, using never used military hard ware (carrier based aircraft) and keeping the whole enterprice secret.
Mark1878
Donor
A tactical success but as Yamamoto knew a strategic failure.
I am not certain that the attack in Asia is so marvellous the Allied response was not great.
I am not refering to the strategic part, but the tactical. Just the audacity to execute an operation on this scale and in a operation theatre of this enourmous size with weapons whihc were hardly used in conflicts before.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
The fundamental problem isn’t the speed of communication or the lack of preparation, availability of personnel, it’s simply the mindset of the players. All of the senior Admirals in the American, British, German, Italian and Japanese naves, were welded to the idea that the Battleship was the premier fighting vessel, and the ultimate decider of battle at sea. All five of the navies had plans to build either bigger and better Battleships, or the ultimate battleship. The Americans were looking at the Montana class, while the British’s had plans for the Lion class, the Germans and the Italians had numerous plans for better battleships, while the Japanese were planning to build the nil plus ultra super Yamato with 20 inch guns. Aircraft carriers were not seen as the major component of the battle line, but as auxiliaries that mirrored the role of scouting cruisers, which in the majority of navies themselves carried scouting aircraft. It was only after the loss temporarily of their battle line at Pearl that the Americans elevated their carriers to the primary position in their fleet. Without the major losses incurred at Pearl, I seriously doubt that the Americans would have promoted carriers to the prime position that they did so quickly. It should also be remembered that it takes a lot less steel in the 1940’s to build a carrier than it does to build a battleship.
Yes their had been exercises during the 30’s that showed that an air strike against Pearl was possible, however given the state of aircraft at the time, they represented very little threat to the battleships of the day. Torpedo bombers that could only carry a 14 inch torpedo with a 300 pound warhead, and bombers that at best carry a single 500 pound bomb. They tremendous advances made in aviation in the late thirties early forties wasn’t imagined by the mostly battleship admirals of the inter war years, and the restrictions in place due to the various international treaties, severely restricted the number and size of aircraft carriers. What was considered a large carrier in 1938, unarmored 20,000 tons, was effectively a light carrier by 1944. It was a combination of the fantastic industrial might of the United States in the naval and aviation sectors, that enabled them to rapidly build and expand their carrier capacity, along with the fleet train to support them. That meant that by 1944, carriers had surpassed battleships as the premier capital units in naval warfare, and were to hold the position up until the present day. Note it was the British who designed the ultimate WWII carrier, but didn’t build it the Malta class, which wasn’t equaled until the Americans began building their Forrestal class in the fifties. One and all in all the major navies carriers, were regarded as auxiliaries to the battle line, and only a few visionaries had envisioned them becoming the primary capital ships, or able to conduct the sort of operations they were able to in the last two years of the war.
RR.
Yes their had been exercises during the 30’s that showed that an air strike against Pearl was possible, however given the state of aircraft at the time, they represented very little threat to the battleships of the day. Torpedo bombers that could only carry a 14 inch torpedo with a 300 pound warhead, and bombers that at best carry a single 500 pound bomb. They tremendous advances made in aviation in the late thirties early forties wasn’t imagined by the mostly battleship admirals of the inter war years, and the restrictions in place due to the various international treaties, severely restricted the number and size of aircraft carriers. What was considered a large carrier in 1938, unarmored 20,000 tons, was effectively a light carrier by 1944. It was a combination of the fantastic industrial might of the United States in the naval and aviation sectors, that enabled them to rapidly build and expand their carrier capacity, along with the fleet train to support them. That meant that by 1944, carriers had surpassed battleships as the premier capital units in naval warfare, and were to hold the position up until the present day. Note it was the British who designed the ultimate WWII carrier, but didn’t build it the Malta class, which wasn’t equaled until the Americans began building their Forrestal class in the fifties. One and all in all the major navies carriers, were regarded as auxiliaries to the battle line, and only a few visionaries had envisioned them becoming the primary capital ships, or able to conduct the sort of operations they were able to in the last two years of the war.
RR.
Sekhmet_D
Kicked
Bloody Shambles states that Ensign Ogata, piloting an E13 recon floatplane from Kamikawa Maru, was the first to spot Flying Officer Bedell's Catalina. He opened fire and Bedell dodged into some clouds.
Unfortunately he then blundered right into the path of Lieutenant Kubotani's five 1st Sentai Ki-27s. They pounced on the Catalina and and downed it with no survivors; this happened so quickly that Bedell's crew were unable to radio Singapore.
Yamashita and Tsuji in Ryujo Maru were informed of the shoot-down; Tsuji at the very least was not upset about this development, calling it "a blood offering to the ground forces" and stating that they should not be negligent, as "there may be other hostile planes which were not shot down" and the convoy "must be concealed even from the gods". There is no record of Ozawa and/or Kondo's thoughts on the matter.
If you take this in conjunction with the information from At Dawn We Slept, it is perhaps possible to conclude that Ogata and Kubotani acted at their own discretion, and their superiors were not unduly concerned about what happened.
Nobody would do anything like that that. Even IOTL they did nothing about it and were not even close to responding to the Ward's messages until after the attack had begun. There was already numerous false alarms with whale sightings and other items in the ocean and they were not going to do anything on a Sunday morning without confirmation.
They would not have did anything with the fleet anyway because a single sub sighting SOUTH of Oahu island means nothing but we have something out there and start checking to make sure one of our Subs was not in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Remember this is Peace time and they were acting and working accordingly, Pearl Was not seen as a primary attack place.
These are not the USMC dive bomber crews of Spring and Summer 1942, the USMC dive bombers squadrons, are newly formed and under training. The USN Carrier pilots on the other hand were good.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Butchpfd, totally agree, http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm is the go to site for IJN. However there is also a useful site here that offers English translation, http://www.tokusetsukansen.jpn.org/E/index.html.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Sekhmet_D, thank you that's really good work, and good to know. I have to write some storylines concerning Yamamoto, Kondo and Ozawa, anything you can find on them personally, and on their relationships would be most welcome.
Fatboy Coxy
Monthly Donor
Hi Mark1878, could you expand on your thoughts on Pearl Harbor being a strategic failure, are you referring to the failure to get the carriers and the oil tanks, or starting the war?
Re the attacks in Asia (Hong Kong, Malaya, Philippines and DEI) I feel this was more like plucking ripen fruit, the problem there is how far to they (Japan) stretch their meagre resources.
I think Mark1878 mean by strategic failure that it didn't crippled the American ability to fight back in the long term, nor to stun the American back into negotiation (to recognize Japan domination in Asia).
Mark1878
Donor
Starting the war with the US in the first place is the strategic mistake.
Agreed with Asia which is why it its not a great tactical victory - the opposition was not good.
In reality, only operating plans through phase II had been prepared. I posted some docs previously in the Panama Canal Attack thread on the composition and disposition of the PacFlt so won't put them here. There is a huge misconception about what PacFlt was preparing for and what their mission was. Once WPL-46 (Navy Basic Plan RAINBOW-5) went into effect, PacFlt was to execute its operating plan, or O-1 plan (WPPac-46). As the current, active situation changed, Kimmel and his War Plans Officer, CAPT "Soc" McMorris promulgated contingency plans modifying the O-1 plan as necessary. As a background, from the Navy Court of Inquiry, here are snippets of the actual war plans:
PacFlt tasks in WPL-46:
WPPac-46 introduced the steps to achieve these tasks in phases. Most OpPlans will play out the entire campaign through phase V. RAINBOW-5 was formulated on adjusting the plan as conditions warranted. PacFlt was already executing portions of Phase I and already preparing for Phase IA, which occurs once Japan attacks.
The operational task organization was slightly modified after the July promulgation of WPPac-46 by Confidential Letter 14CL-41 on 31 October. I've highlighted the missions of each. Note that the primary fighting task forces all had a carrier assigned when operating independently. During various exercises that fall when two or more task forces operated together, Halsey often had the CVs grouped together.
As the plan existed before PH, there was no intention to return the BBs to the West Coast. In fact, WPPac-46 was actually pretty aggressive and emphasized CV ops, contrary to post war popular opinion and the chest thumping from NAVAIR - and I even recognize this as a former CV aviator and strike IP. More on this next.
They were being updated , Colorado ewas already at Bremerton, getting a motor rewind, radar and 20mm AAA. There is a photo of her there with HMS Warspite in the foreground. At Bremerton.
There were 2 squadrons one flying Vindicators and one flying the Dauntless
Sekhmet_D
Kicked
Kondo and Yamamoto were old friends, which explains why he was not censured too severely after the Solomons debacle. He was solid and reliable, if somewhat plodding.
Ozawa also enjoyed Yamamoto's trust; as noted earlier, Yamamoto wanted him to command Kido Butai but seniority (and the Naval General Staff) dictated that Nagumo got the job instead. He was daring and imaginative with his strategies, an out of the box thinker.
By all accounts the relationship between Kondo and Ozawa was a cordial one and they worked well together.
So, in Phase I and IA there were a set of tentative OPLANs for each to accomplish the tasks. Note that the PacFlt organization was modified with 14CL-41, but the gist is the same.
Now No. 1A-R5:
Note the highlighted parts. Kimmel, that horrible battleship admiral, was grouping his 3 CVs into a raiding and strike force. This is a recipe for a limited fleet action that Edward Miller pointed out in his book War Plan Orange. This is the Marshal Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, and here's how this is developed in WPPac-46, Annex II:
If you've been able to wade through this this far, kudos. What the Recce and Raiding plan is trying to do, by diverting attention from the Malay Barrier, is to pull off a detachment of the IJN and allow the weaker PacFlt (and Stark and Kimmel were screaming this fact to FDR) to engage them on favorable terms. In their PHA interviews both CAPT Smith, Kimmel's COS, and McMorris mentioned that their plans were aggressive. It was hoped a detachment of the IJN would take the bait and pursue Halsey into the guns of Pye commanding the BBs of the covering force. Notice how TF-2 is significantly beefed up with all the Brooklyns and TF-3 - literally a fast carrier striking force - which would be able to handle itself providing the Kongos didn't show up. Internally, they may have operated as 3 CV TGs and probably a surface striking TG, but, as can be seen, PacFlt was already taking account of the increased speed and striking power of the CV and their air groups and this is reflected in their plan, published in July and approved by Stark in September.
Next will be Kimmel's modifications up to PH.
Now No. 1A-R5:
Note the highlighted parts. Kimmel, that horrible battleship admiral, was grouping his 3 CVs into a raiding and strike force. This is a recipe for a limited fleet action that Edward Miller pointed out in his book War Plan Orange. This is the Marshal Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, and here's how this is developed in WPPac-46, Annex II:
If you've been able to wade through this this far, kudos. What the Recce and Raiding plan is trying to do, by diverting attention from the Malay Barrier, is to pull off a detachment of the IJN and allow the weaker PacFlt (and Stark and Kimmel were screaming this fact to FDR) to engage them on favorable terms. In their PHA interviews both CAPT Smith, Kimmel's COS, and McMorris mentioned that their plans were aggressive. It was hoped a detachment of the IJN would take the bait and pursue Halsey into the guns of Pye commanding the BBs of the covering force. Notice how TF-2 is significantly beefed up with all the Brooklyns and TF-3 - literally a fast carrier striking force - which would be able to handle itself providing the Kongos didn't show up. Internally, they may have operated as 3 CV TGs and probably a surface striking TG, but, as can be seen, PacFlt was already taking account of the increased speed and striking power of the CV and their air groups and this is reflected in their plan, published in July and approved by Stark in September.
Next will be Kimmel's modifications up to PH.
Cruiser sweeping plans were pretty much the first thing to go, which is why I didn't include them in the docs I posted. Just before PH, TF-2 carved out TF-8 for the Wake reinforcement and TF-3 carved out TF-12 for the same at Midway. Many of Kimmel's cruisers were detached already as escorts either for convoys or other exercises, especially those of TF-3. Those not escorting convoys were to be recalled. If the Atlantic Reinforcement (CruDiv-5) wasn't ordered immediately to King, Kimmel could use them. Soc McMorris sent contingency memos to Kimmel, and per testimony, these were his intentions in the event of hostilities. Obviously, the successful IJN CV attack on PH caused these, as envisioned, to be canx, but they were later resurrected becoming the CV raids that occurred in early 1942.
PacFlt dispositions for each TF on 7 Dec:
Soc's memos to Kimmel modifying WPPac-46 and his intensions:
30 Nov 41:
Same for 5 Dec 41:
None of these plans matter if Kimmel is only given 30 min to an hour warning. The fleet doesn't have the time to concentrate and put the Marhsall Island Recce and Raiding Plan into effect. As mentioned by others, he probably gets more aircraft in the air, time for his ships to be placed into a better battle condition, maybe sorties his cruisers and destroyers not in the yard, and puts up a more effective AA defense, but he still gets hammered. He may not lose Arizona and Oklahoma, but the damage will be significant. They may even get lucky with a few extra PBYs and B-17s airborne to spot the IJN TF or get a better idea of where it is. Regardless, TF-1 is probably immobilized and sent to the West Coast like it was after PH. The DDs, AO's and auxiliaries do not exist for anything more than what had been mapped out in WPPac-46, and after a few months of high tempo operations and exorbitant fuel consumption, even those logistic plans are deemed insufficient. The Marshalls cannot be seized anytime soon.
So, this is how PacFlt is supposed to influence Japanese operations. With 30 chapters to go, hopefully some of this helps when the author gets to the PH part.
PacFlt dispositions for each TF on 7 Dec:
Soc's memos to Kimmel modifying WPPac-46 and his intensions:
30 Nov 41:
Same for 5 Dec 41:
None of these plans matter if Kimmel is only given 30 min to an hour warning. The fleet doesn't have the time to concentrate and put the Marhsall Island Recce and Raiding Plan into effect. As mentioned by others, he probably gets more aircraft in the air, time for his ships to be placed into a better battle condition, maybe sorties his cruisers and destroyers not in the yard, and puts up a more effective AA defense, but he still gets hammered. He may not lose Arizona and Oklahoma, but the damage will be significant. They may even get lucky with a few extra PBYs and B-17s airborne to spot the IJN TF or get a better idea of where it is. Regardless, TF-1 is probably immobilized and sent to the West Coast like it was after PH. The DDs, AO's and auxiliaries do not exist for anything more than what had been mapped out in WPPac-46, and after a few months of high tempo operations and exorbitant fuel consumption, even those logistic plans are deemed insufficient. The Marshalls cannot be seized anytime soon.
So, this is how PacFlt is supposed to influence Japanese operations. With 30 chapters to go, hopefully some of this helps when the author gets to the PH part.
Rainbow 5 was an abstract strategic plan not an actual war plan. Most of the Pacific admirals were aviation minded and had no interest in bringing 20 kt battleships with them. They didn't have enough tankers or destroyers to support the battleline anyway. Most of the battleships at Pearl Harbor needed up grades that needed to be done on the West Coast. New crews needed to be trained to operate new radar and AA guns. New better protected Fast Battleships that could make 27-28 kts would be sent to operate with carrier raiding groups.
Nobody was thinking about having the USS Pennsylvania shell Truk in December 1941. At Midway Nimitz had 5 BBs that he let sit out the battle. He lacked escorts for them, and they were too slow and would only get in the way of faster ships. Only Fast BBs were ever used to directly confront the enemy surface fleet except under the very favorable circumstances at Surigao Stright. Task Force 1 spent most of the war guarding the West Coast. Some of the old BBs escorted convoys, and that was the best place for them. Later they did good service shelling islands in support of amphibious operations, but not till late 1943 when they could be properly protected.