Malaya What If

[Butchpfd]

If the information about the attack on HMS Reguius, manages to reach Pearl Harbour by the evening of the 6th, and into the hands of either Admiral Kimmel or his deputy. What are the chances that it could affect the alert status of the American forces in Hawaii to such an extent that the Japanese dawn attack on the 7th would be seriously affected. To which question my personal perspective is a resounding no, for two reasons. First and foremost the American authorities will want independence confirmation of the information before taking any action, along with instructions from Washington. Secondly it requires the authorities to appreciate the threat that exists, which they perceive to be sabotage, not a direct assault on the Islands. Despite the recent attack by the British on Taranto in the Mediterranean, there was no perception that such an attack could take place against Pearl, without a prior formal declaration of war. Nor it should be noted was this the Japanese plan, their plan was for there to be a formal declaration of war to be delivered in Washington, swiftly followed up by the attack on Pearl. The fact that this wouldn’t give sufficient time for the information of the declaration to be propagated to Pearl didn’t matter, as in Japanese eyes that was the Americans problem. And even if the declaration had been received in Washington and the Americans had by a miracle been able to inform Pearl, very little would have changed in the alert status in Pearl. As previously said the risk as the administration in Pearl saw it was primarily of sabotage attacks, as apposed to an assault on the Island. The Americans were more worried about a naval bombardment followed by an invasion attempt, than they were by an air strike, no one at the time had envisioned, a combined air attack from six aircraft carriers , the normal expectation was that combining more than two aircraft carriers together was unworkable. Pearl was a very long way away from any Japanese base and the Americans fully expected to receive sufficient warning of any approaching Japanese fleet. The idea that the Japanese could assemble a massive fleet containing all of their fleet carriers, leaving all their other fleets devoid of carriers, and sail it across the Pacific to Pearl, without being detected. Never crossed the minds of the United States Navy higher command, it was basically inconceivable at the time. So despite events in the South China Sea, my personal belief is the the Americans in both the Philippines and Pearl Harbour, will ITTL be caught with their thumb up their bum and their brains in neutral. The only officer that has a good chance of being awake and on his game is Admiral Hart, and he unfortunately has the dead hand of MacArthur and Washington constraining his actions.

RR.

OTL at this time Hart was loading his fleet train with supplies and munitions; 8", 6", 5"/25, 3"/50, 4"/50, 3"/23, , 1.1", .50 Cal, MK VIII, Mk XIV torpedoes, the MK X's for the S boats and the oldest 5 fleet boats were to be the last loaded and go on the USS Canopus, and most were still in the Torpedo shop or warehouse at Cavite when it was bombed. Some MK VIII , MK X, and MK XIV had been moved by barge to Marivales Station on Bataan.

 

[DDM]

How would this be different from the "War Warning" issued on 27 November? Pearl Harbor went on alert immediately after that; by 7 December, as there had been no action for ten days, the alert was relaxed. Such a report would be obscure, not definite. Churchill might pass it on, but not as urgent or requiring immediate action; he did not want to "cry wolf".

It's also not clear that it would get to Churchill immediately or during working hours, or that Churchill's message would get to Roosevelt immediately or during working hours. 2230 in Singapore is 1430 in London and 0930 in Washington, but it's Saturday. And 0230 in Hawaii - on Saturday, 6 December.

Which raises a question: the strike on Pearl Harbor was at 0700 on 7 December, which is 1400 in Washington, 1900 in London, and 0300 in Singapore on 8 December. The OTL Japanese landings in Malaya were at 0215 on 8 December. If the Japanese are planning to land on 8 December as OTL, would their invasion fleet be at sea on 6 December? Time zones make this very confusing.

From the Indochina coast to Malaya is about 400 km, which would be about 20 hours steaming at 12 knots. So to arrive at 0200, they would depart at 0600 the previous day (7 December). Which means, I guess, that they would be at sea on 6 December, moving to the assembly area.

I guess we have to remember that the Japanese did everything on Tokyo time (two hours ahead of Singapore time), and that in their orders and records, the strike on Pearl Harbor was on 8 December. So 6 December in Malaya is still over a day from action (on Japan's schedule). Gort has to be very careful not to launch MATADOR too early (or too late). Gort said "I would go Sunday morning...", that is, 0600 on 7 December, which would be about 20 hours before the Japanese landings.

It's about 100 km from the border to Singora, 150km to Pattani (along the road). Arriving before the Japanese would almost certainly provoke resistance from Thai forces. (OTL, Thai forces resisted the Japanese landings for hours, until ordered from Bangkok to stand down.) What Thai forces are stationed at the border or along the road?

The launching of Matador is a major event that could indeed cause butterflies to help Pearl Harbor. Since it will occur almost a full day ahead of the air attack. Again I don't mean the Kido Butai being discovered or fighters in the air but once the operation is launched it is likely that Kimmel and Short will call their staffs for meetings. Kimmel was already apprehensive with not knowing where the Japanese carriers were. The message about the Ward firing on a sub could find its way to him in a meeting. With 30 minutes warning the ships in harbor would be buttoned up with guns manned and damage control set. There will still be multiple ships taking major damage and really nothing will save the airfields but as I said earlier the Japanese will take greater losses and not achieve the same hit rates. It will still be a loss for the US but just not as bad.

 

[Belisarius II]

The launching of Matador is a major event that could indeed cause butterflies to help Pearl Harbor. Since it will occur almost a full day ahead of the air attack. Again I don't mean the Kido Butai being discovered or fighters in the air but once the operation is launched it is likely that Kimmel and Short will call their staffs for meetings. Kimmel was already apprehensive with not knowing where the Japanese carriers were. The message about the Ward firing on a sub could find its way to him in a meeting. With 30 minutes warning the ships in harbor would be buttoned up with guns manned and damage control set. There will still be multiple ships taking major damage and really nothing will save the airfields but as I said earlier the Japanese will take greater losses and not achieve the same hit rates. It will still be a loss for the US but just not as bad.

Very problematic. If Kimmel & Short got 30 minutes warning by finding there was a sub attack, would they assume an air attack is coming? If the radar sighting is taken seriously 40-50 fighters might get into the air and gain some altitude to meet the incoming attack. Manned AA guns could make a big difference, but everything depends on Kimmel & Short predicting an air attack. Short thought the danger was from sabotage and so lined up planes on the runways, making everything easy for the Japanese.

 

[Belisarius II]

One thing I've never been able to find out - were the Antares/Ward reports something new, or had the guardships been attacking suspicious whales, oil slicks and floating logs every other day for the last month? There's nothing like repeated false alarms to dull the response to a real one.
Likewise early radar was limited in accuracy and often very flaky in operation - something that OTL would bite the USN repeatedly in the Solomons. Was the signal anything clearer than "airborne contact NNE, maximum range, unknown numbers, unknown altitude", at a time when by pure mischance, friendly aircraft were expected from the North?

It should have been clear that the radar contact of the IJNAF attack force was far too big to be a flight of a dozen B-17's. Inexperience and a lax attitude wasted the advantage radar should've given the air defense command. So many mistakes were made by the Americans leading up to the air attack on Pearl Harbor that the events seem so improbable that conspiracy theories have tried to make sense out of them. Unfortunately, human fallibility is many times less believable than the weirdest conspiracy theory.

 

[DDM]

Very problematic. If Kimmel & Short got 30 minutes warning by finding there was a sub attack, would they assume an air attack is coming? If the radar sighting is taken seriously 40-50 fighters might get into the air and gain some altitude to meet the incoming attack. Manned AA guns could make a big difference, but everything depends on Kimmel & Short predicting an air attack. Short thought the danger was from sabotage and so lined up planes on the runways, making everything easy for the Japanese.

One major difference is that it is probable thr command post is fully manned and its not a Lt making the call on the radar sighting. Again. No guarantees but if the Balloon is official up it may change some attitudes just enough. I still expect no more than 30 minutes warning even if things go as I have said. There was still no real search plan so radar will be first warning of the strike. Submarine report will just serve to heighten attention since war is on going with the launching of Matador plus the Regulus being depth charged.

 

[Butchpfd]

The launching of Matador is a major event that could indeed cause butterflies to help Pearl Harbor. Since it will occur almost a full day ahead of the air attack. Again I don't mean the Kido Butai being discovered or fighters in the air but once the operation is launched it is likely that Kimmel and Short will call their staffs for meetings. Kimmel was already apprehensive with not knowing where the Japanese carriers were. The message about the Ward firing on a sub could find its way to him in a meeting. With 30 minutes warning the ships in harbor would be buttoned up with guns manned and damage control set. There will still be multiple ships taking major damage and really nothing will save the airfields but as I said earlier the Japanese will take greater losses and not achieve the same hit rates. It will still be a loss for the US but just not as bad.

Possible but you are still looking at a serious time lag, hopefully you get the 30 min warning. Actually it i smore important that 14th Naval District and Admiral Bloche gets the word. In harbor and at anchor he is in charge of all ships and port facilities. It was Bloche and his duty officer OTL that ordered for ships to sorte and sent out the Message" Air Raid Pearl Harbor, this is Not a Drill", what is remarkable is that exact same message was sent out by HQ Patrol Wing 2 . https://www.history.navy.mil/resear...attack/patrol-wing-pby-two-action-report.html

 

[Butchpfd]

As I said

It should have been clear that the radar contact of the IJNAF attack force was far too big to be a flight of a dozen B-17's. Inexperience and a lax attitude wasted the advantage radar should've given the air defense command. So many mistakes were made by the Americans leading up to the air attack on Pearl Harbor that the events seem so improbable that conspiracy theories have tried to make sense out of them. Unfortunately, human fallibility is many times less believable than the weirdest conspiracy theAs I saidory.

As I said in an earlier pose.. Murphy had a field day !The IJN threw 7s all day, while the USN threw snake eyes across the board!

 

[Butchpfd]

It's su

One major difference is that it is probable thr command post is fully manned and its not a Lt making the call on the radar sighting. Again. No guarantees but if the Balloon is official up it may change some attitudes just enough. I still expect no more than 30 minutes warning even if things go as I have said. There was still no real search plan so radar will be first warning of the strike. Submarine report will just serve to heighten attention since war is on going with the launching of Matador plus the Regulus being depth charged.

It's 0700 on a Sunday morning in Hawaii, the fleet's in Most aircraft are standing down 70% of Army and 50% of navy were on weekend passes , or were back aboard by midnight. There were serious parties at all the Officers Clubs. Recalling anyone for the Army on 30 minute notice will be tough getting the Control room manned with competent people will take much longer.

 

[pdf27]

Now what happens is there can be complicated. Is there an officer on duty authorized to decode a dispatch from CinC AF to CinC Pac if yes message decoded by 2200 hours and sent to duty Staff officer, who makes decision to or not to notify Adm. Kimmel, or place it in his priority inbox for Monday Morning. If no officer Present does duty officer attempt someone who can decode message. Does officer come in or inform communication center to hold message until normal duty officer arrives..
It is now 2300 hours 6 December Honolulu time what happens?? (7 hours until Antares sighting of Mini Sub and 6 hours until USS Ward attacks Midget Sub)(9 hours until Japanese aircraft attack)

Sorry for being long winded, but in 1941 it was more complicate sending a message 1/3rd of the way around the world in 1941.

I'd be pretty surprised if there wasn't a watch-stander authorised to decode such messages: there is clearly heightened tension even if not at war, so it seems very unlikely that it would not be decoded.
As for the reaction, at most they'd take the Antares/Ward sighting more seriously - Pearl Harbour is so far from anything that an air attack is very unlikely, and a co-ordinated submarine and air attack on a shallow harbour is not something they're going to be thinking about in the middle of the night on a weekend while at peace.
Best guess? Maybe a couple of extra patrol aircraft go out in the morning and get shot down.

 

[Parma]

Interesting discussion of a depth charge attack from a Japanese Imperial Navy ship on a British Royal Navy submarine may trigger or not the USA Pacific fleet.
It is not only the stand of technology of the communication techniques or the (non-) ability for decoding of that time period.

The bottom line is that it is more a mental thing. The Japanese are gooing to do something on the 7th and 8th ( depending the date line) which was never done before and for nearly every body is inconceivable.
There is probably a psygological term for, but unbeleivable things can happen even in our time with lightning speed communications and unbeleivable de-coding techniques.
If people can not imagine the posibility of an event than they can not accept that a certian event even can happen. After the unbelivable event happened, people willl be still in shock that the event was possible in the first place.

 

[DDM]

It's su

It's 0700 on a Sunday morning in Hawaii, the fleet's in Most aircraft are standing down 70% of Army and 50% of navy were on weekend passes , or were back aboard by midnight. There were serious parties at all the Officers Clubs. Recalling anyone for the Army on 30 minute notice will be tough getting the Control room manned with competent people will take much longer.

Except the recall starts the day before due to Matador.

 

[Butchpfd]

Except the recall starts the day before due

You still have a minimum time lag of 18 hours just to get info to Washington, then to Pearl, Adm Hart in Manila, can be a touch more alert, but Mac Arthur won't. He ignored direct instructions hand carried to him by Breeton.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Except the recall starts the day before due to Matador.

The problem with a more alert Pearl harbour is that they did not think or conceive that such a long range attack was possible.

The whole point of having the fleet at Pearl (and at one point even San Diego) and not forward deployed to the Philippines was to keep it out of range of any such an attack.

So even with a concrete earlier war warning does not automatically translate into a more prepared US armed forces against the Kido Butai surprise attack.

But its not in the realms of impossibility that the entire garrison would be stood to at Dawn and not sleepy and hungover.

But It might also still be a case of being ready and still being surprised like what happened on Ceylon with the British Pilots in their planes engines warmed up and ready to go and still on the ground when the first Japanese aircraft arrived overhead!

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

The whole point of having the fleet at Pearl (and at one point even San Diego) and not forward deployed to the Philippines was to keep it out of range of any such an attack.

And having it stationed where there was base capacity to support it. US Navy facilities in the Philippines were grossly inadequate for the Pacific Fleet.

And of course, the primary function of the Pacific Fleet was to defend the west coast of the United States.

 

[Driftless]

The problem with a more alert Pearl harbour is that they did not think or conceive that such a long range attack was possible.

There was a fleet excercise done in the late 30's showing Pearl Harbor's vulnerability to (Japanese) carrier attack. I believe that excercise was run by Admiral Richardson, the same leader who was so adamantly against moving the bulk of the US battlefleet from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor, that he got sacked. His replacement was Admiral Kimmel.....

 

[Cryhavoc101]

And having it stationed where there was base capacity to support it. US Navy facilities in the Philippines were grossly inadequate for the Pacific Fleet.

And of course, the primary function of the Pacific Fleet was to defend the west coast of the United States.

Yes the USN had zero intention of fighting the Japanese in a major fleet action around the Philippines and the Mandates plan was kind of enshrined throughout the late 20s and 30s.

And with independence being granted to the Philippines there was little appetite in spending vast sums of monies on bases which could be simply handed over to the Philippines.

 

[Butchpfd]

And having it stationed where there was base capacity to support it. US Navy facilities in the Philippines were grossly inadequate for the Pacific Fleet.

And of course, the primary function of the Pacific Fleet was to defend the west coast of the United States.

Correct, max capacity of Dewy Drydock was 20, 000 tons and @ 600 foot, 2 marine railways, 2500 tons and @300 foot; pierside you could just get Houston and Marbelhead, inadequate ammunition storage, and not enough fleet train, for the existing fleet. That is why they were developing Marivales on Bataan, but needed another year to finish. Hart and his predecessor Harry Yarnell wanted Sangley Point air station developed to handle wheeled aircraft, and wanted a carrier airgroup size a air group there. At one time Asiatic fleet had squadrons of float torpedo bombers. Air Defences for Cavite, Mariveles, and Subic Bay: 28 x3"AAA, 50 x .50 cal AAMG

 

[Butchpfd]

There was a fleet excercise done in the late 30's showing Pearl Harbor's vulnerability to (Japanese) carrier attack. I believe that excercise was run by Admiral Richardson, the same leader who was so adamantly against moving the bulk of the US battlefleet from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor, that he got sacked. His replacement was Admiral Kimmel.....

The carrier commander was Harry Yarnell, 1936 to 1939 CinC Asiatic Fleet who advocated Navy/ Marine air for Philippines

 

[jlckansas]

The biggest problem that exists is the Philippines is a Major Army command and not a navy command. For all intents and purposes the Asiatic Fleet was not meant to be an equal to the Army command in the Philippine Islands. It was not necessarily subordinate but was looked upon as being more oriented toward China and trade between Asia and US.

 

[Belisarius II]

Intersting discussion of a depth charge attack from Japanese Imperial Navy ship on a British Royal Navy submarine may trigger or not the USA Pacific fleet.
It is not only the stand of technology of the communication techniques or the (non-) ability for decoding of that time period.

The bottom line is that it is more a mental thing. The Japanese are gooing to do something on the 7th and 8th ( depending the date line) which was never done before and for nealry every body is inconceivable.
There is probably a psygological term for, but unbeleivable things can happen even in our time with lightning speed communications and unbeleivable de-coding techniques.
If people can not imagine the posibility of an event than they can not accept that a certian event even can happen. After the unbelivable event happened, people willl be still in shock that the event was possible in the first place.

But even still an attack in Southeast Asia was what was expected. U.S. intel was suggesting that's where Japan was going to strike. That's why Admiral Stark when he got the first message "Air raid Pearl Harbor." he said, "No, this must be a mistake. They must mean the Philippines."