Malaya What If

[Fatboy Coxy]

And so, it begins

and

Rule Britannia

as well as

and here we go!

Hi HMS St. Lawrence, Jlkansas, Kelgar04, and others, not wishing to dampen your enthusiasm, but we have another six posts setting the scene before kick off, excruciating isn't it!

 

[Sekhmet_D]

There was no real plan for long range recon as they had decided they simply didn't have the planes necessary. As for a counter strike sadly the air power on the islands at that time was not impressive for a counterstrike. Something like 2 dozen dauntless, 1/2 a dozen vindicators, 1/2 a dozen flyable B-17's and a 1/2 dozen flyable A-20's.

Two dozen Dauntlesses is not insignificant, considering what happened at Midway and that the CAP over Kido Butai for the Pearl operation was very weak.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

At this point, how close to OTL course is this version of Force Z? Plus, there's more ships than OTL, correct? And in theory, weather permitting, there's at least the prospect of friendly air cover.

Hi Driftless, there are major differences to OTL. Firstly Force Z didn't sail until 17.10 on 8th of December, which is over 60 hours, or two and a half days later, reacting and not be proactive which is what is happening in my timeline. Secondly, the size of Force Z is massively bigger than just the two capital ships and four destroyers. Thirdly, there is a limited air cooperation and defence plan worked out with the RAF, and lastly the radar suites and AA guns are working fine. Of all these changes I consider the radar and AA guns difference to be a real stretch in being realistic, and I would understand if people take umbrage with that point, the other changes I feel are completely acceptable.

As to the weather, well that will be factor in the entire conflict.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Surely they would have known at the flag officer level. I can't see Kondo and Ozawa being unaware that Pearl was going to be hit.

Hi Sekhmet_D, that's an interesting question, and one I don't know. I'm assuming both Kondo and Ozawa are aware that there are plans afoot, but would lack details. Can anyone answer this question better?

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Now this is a show of cooperation between the British and Dutch navies. A squadron
composed of a Dutch and Brisitsh flotilla of light cruisers and destroyers.
A Royal Netherlands Navy flottilla as an integrated part of a Royal Navy battle group, it is almost a revival of old times, from the age of sail 😄

Hi Parma, I thought in the days of sail we were on opposing sides, and fairly battered each other, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Dutch_Wars

 

[HMS St.Lawrence]

and

as well as

Hi HMS St. Lawrence, Jlkansas, Kelgar04, and others, not wishing to dampen your enthusiasm, but we have another six posts setting the scene before kick off, excruciating isn't it!

They say good things come to those who wait.

And now I have a countdown!

 

[HJ Tulp]

Hi Parma, I thought in the days of sail we were on opposing sides, and fairly battered each other, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Dutch_Wars

This is mainly through. After the Glorious Invasion though, there was a periode of several decades where the Dutch and British navies jointly operated against the French and Spanish fleets!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

If the information about the attack on HMS Reguius, manages to reach Pearl Harbour by the evening of the 6th, and into the hands of either Admiral Kimmel or his deputy. What are the chances that it could affect the alert status of the American forces in Hawaii to such an extent that the Japanese dawn attack on the 7th would be seriously affected. To which question my personal perspective is a resounding no, for two reasons. First and foremost the American authorities will want independence confirmation of the information before taking any action, along with instructions from Washington. Secondly it requires the authorities to appreciate the threat that exists, which they perceive to be sabotage, not a direct assault on the Islands. Despite the recent attack by the British on Taranto in the Mediterranean, there was no perception that such an attack could take place against Pearl, without a prior formal declaration of war. Nor it should be noted was this the Japanese plan, their plan was for there to be a formal declaration of war to be delivered in Washington, swiftly followed up by the attack on Pearl. The fact that this wouldn’t give sufficient time for the information of the declaration to be propagated to Pearl didn’t matter, as in Japanese eyes that was the Americans problem. And even if the declaration had been received in Washington and the Americans had by a miracle been able to inform Pearl, very little would have changed in the alert status in Pearl. As previously said the risk as the administration in Pearl saw it was primarily of sabotage attacks, as apposed to an assault on the Island. The Americans were more worried about a naval bombardment followed by an invasion attempt, than they were by an air strike, no one at the time had envisioned, a combined air attack from six aircraft carriers , the normal expectation was that combining more than two aircraft carriers together was unworkable. Pearl was a very long way away from any Japanese base and the Americans fully expected to receive sufficient warning of any approaching Japanese fleet. The idea that the Japanese could assemble a massive fleet containing all of their fleet carriers, leaving all their other fleets devoid of carriers, and sail it across the Pacific to Pearl, without being detected. Never crossed the minds of the United States Navy higher command, it was basically inconceivable at the time. So despite events in the South China Sea, my personal belief is the the Americans in both the Philippines and Pearl Harbour, will ITTL be caught with their thumb up their bum and their brains in neutral. The only officer that has a good chance of being awake and on his game is Admiral Hart, and he unfortunately has the dead hand of MacArthur and Washington constraining his actions.

RR.

Hi Ramp-Rat, I totally agree with this, except for one point. Having pointed out how exceptional this attack was, breaking new ground in carrier operations as well as replenishment at sea, I feel your assessment of the American leadership is somewhat unfair. I struggle to find a comparable event other than 9/11. Opening attacks like Barbarossa and the Yom Kippur war fall short on the highly technical achievement of the IJN in undertaking this. Hindsight is great at pointing out what should be the obvious, but despite the clues offered up on Japanese intensions and the sluggish American response, I don't 'see' this as obvious at all. A comparable lack of threat awareness would be the sinking of the Royal Oak at Scarpa Flow. In my mind Pearl Harbour should be seen as a outstanding Japanese success rather than an American failure.

Obviously there has and will be a lot written about Pearl Harbor, it remains a key event in American history. However, my TL is about Singapore, and although it would be fun to write a ATL on Pearl Harbor, I have neither the knowledge or inclination to try this. So while I don't want to stop the debate on possible warnings being heeded which is very interesting to read, Pearl Harbor in my TL will happen as it did historically. I have a story on it, to cover the event, and hopefully it is correct and detailed enough to satisfy my readership, however, keeping things in chronological order, I have over 30, yes thirty, stories before that fateful event, there is a LOT of cover.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

Regulus was a trip wire position. It would go to Singapore, they would be listening in for the subs to check in, first then on the Theater command link with London bypassing the Navy setup. Basically it would be sent in the most direct way possible from CinC Singapore to the CIGS in London on the Cables. I could see them use multiple ways for this, even using the TransPac to US or Canada and on to UK just to make sure it makes it. Regulus is under direct command in Singapore and not Ceylon and the Naval command would be passing that up to the CinC Singapore not to Phillips afloat except as a passing of information to him.

Hi Jlckansas, spot on, Regulus and the two Dutch submarines, O=19 and O-20 are in a picket formation, acting as a tripwire, see https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/malaya-what-if.521982/post-24718115

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

How would this be different from the "War Warning" issued on 27 November? Pearl Harbor went on alert immediately after that; by 7 December, as there had been no action for ten days, the alert was relaxed. Such a report would be obscure, not definite. Churchill might pass it on, but not as urgent or requiring immediate action; he did not want to "cry wolf".

It's also not clear that it would get to Churchill immediately or during working hours, or that Churchill's message would get to Roosevelt immediately or during working hours. 2230 in Singapore is 1430 in London and 0930 in Washington, but it's Saturday. And 0230 in Hawaii - on Saturday, 6 December.

Which raises a question: the strike on Pearl Harbor was at 0700 on 7 December, which is 1400 in Washington, 1900 in London, and 0300 in Singapore on 8 December. The OTL Japanese landings in Malaya were at 0215 on 8 December. If the Japanese are planning to land on 8 December as OTL, would their invasion fleet be at sea on 6 December? Time zones make this very confusing.

From the Indochina coast to Malaya is about 400 km, which would be about 20 hours steaming at 12 knots. So to arrive at 0200, they would depart at 0600 the previous day (7 December). Which means, I guess, that they would be at sea on 6 December, moving to the assembly area.

I guess we have to remember that the Japanese did everything on Tokyo time (two hours ahead of Singapore time), and that in their orders and records, the strike on Pearl Harbor was on 8 December. So 6 December in Malaya is still over a day from action (on Japan's schedule). Gort has to be very careful not to launch MATADOR too early (or too late). Gort said "I would go Sunday morning...", that is, 0600 on 7 December, which would be about 20 hours before the Japanese landings.

It's about 100 km from the border to Singora, 150km to Pattani (along the road). Arriving before the Japanese would almost certainly provoke resistance from Thai forces. (OTL, Thai forces resisted the Japanese landings for hours, until ordered from Bangkok to stand down.) What Thai forces are stationed at the border or along the road?

Hi Anarch, the whole Pearl Harbor event on the 7th December can completely confuse the reader in following things in a chronological order. For my timeline we are working mostly on Singapore time, except where I indicate otherwise. So Pearl Harbor will happen on December 8th, (December 7th Hawaii Time). The Japanese approach is certainly a much simpler way of managing things.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

One major difference is that it is probable thr command post is fully manned and its not a Lt making the call on the radar sighting. Again. No guarantees but if the Balloon is official up it may change some attitudes just enough. I still expect no more than 30 minutes warning even if things go as I have said. There was still no real search plan so radar will be first warning of the strike. Submarine report will just serve to heighten attention since war is on going with the launching of Matador plus the Regulus being depth charged.

Hi DDM, Matador is on! 😱 how did that slip by, Lord Gort is going to be furious with me, not to mention the large number of re-writes I'm going to have to do. No, under the Bullring Operational umbrella, Picador is on, the sailing of Force Z, but Lord Gort hasn't launched Matador.

 

[Butchpfd]

Hi Sekhmet_D, that's an interesting question, and one I don't know. I'm assuming both Kondo and Ozawa are aware that there are plans afoot, but would lack details. Can anyone answer this question better?

Take a gander over at Combinedfleet.com. IMO best eng.ush language site about the Japanexe Navy.

 

[Belisarius II]

And having it stationed where there was base capacity to support it. US Navy facilities in the Philippines were grossly inadequate for the Pacific Fleet.

And of course, the primary function of the Pacific Fleet was to defend the west coast of the United States.

In the event of war, the navy was going to send the battleships back to the West Coast to update them, and train new reserve crews. The Pacific Fleet didn't have enough tankers to keep them at sea for a long period of time. There weren't really enough destroyers to escort all those capital ships, or tankers to fuel them all up. There was never going to be a march across the Pacific to relieve the Philippines. The attack on Pearl Harbor really achieved very little in effecting naval strategy. On a geo-strategic level, it was a disaster for Japan by infuriating the American public.

 

[Belisarius II]

Two dozen Dauntlesses is not insignificant, considering what happened at Midway and that the CAP over Kido Butai for the Pearl operation was very weak.

Two dozen SBDs could sink 1-2 carriers.

 

[DDM]

Two dozen SBDs could sink 1-2 carriers.

These were Marine flown and I do know if they had been trained in true dive bombing. I say this because the Marine pilots at Midway used glide bombing as they were apparently not trained well enough at the time to dive bomb.

 

[jlckansas]

These were Marine flown and I do know if they had been trained in true dive bombing. I say this because the Marine pilots at Midway used glide bombing as they were apparently not trained well enough at the time to dive bomb.

The Marine pilots at Midway flew Vindicators, SB2U's, and they were not rated to dive at the angle the SBD Dauntless's were supposed to dive at. It was not a matter of training, the USMC pilots received the same training as the USN pilots did for each type because the USMC and USN trained their pilots together.

 

[Butchpfd]

In the event of war, the navy was going to send the battleships back to the West Coast to update them, and train new reserve crews. The Pacific Fleet didn't have enough tankers to keep them at sea for a long period of time. There weren't really enough destroyers to escort all those capital ships, or tankers to fuel them all up. There was never going to be a march across the Pacific to relieve the Philippines. The attack on Pearl Harbor really achieved very little in effecting naval strategy. On a geo-strategic level, it was a disaster for Japan by infuriating the American public.

Also the battlFleet. being disabled forced the Pacific Fleet to go from a 20 knot speed Fleet to a 28 knot fleet.

In reality like the Civil War, where the Union wound up conducting Winfield Scott's 1861 Annaconda Plantn defeat the South, the United States used Good old War Plan Orange to defeat the Japanese..

 

[Sekhmet_D]

Hi Sekhmet_D, that's an interesting question, and one I don't know. I'm assuming both Kondo and Ozawa are aware that there are plans afoot, but would lack details. Can anyone answer this question better?

Take a gander over at Combinedfleet.com. IMO best eng.ush language site about the Japanexe Navy.

As good a website as Combined Fleet is, it doesn't really address the question directly.

So I went and did some digging through relevant books instead. And I found the following passages in 'At Dawn We Slept'.

First, concerning Kondo.

"The task force setup used at the Nagato table maneuvers pleased no one except those responsible for the Southern Operation. And as intended, this
practice session brought to the surface a number of problems, including the urgent question of how to synchronize the Pearl Harbor venture with the
southern campaign. The vast invasion fleet with its convoys transporting thousands of troops and tons of supplies to Malaya would be under way long
before X-Day, impossible to conceal on those well-traveled sea-lanes. If British reconnaissance planes or surface craft spotted and shadowed Kondo's ships,
should the Japanese ignore the scouts or shoot them down?

"Naturally Kondo would prefer to knock out any Allied scouts before they could relay his position to their headquarters, but on this point Nagumo was
adamant. He insisted that there be no hostilities whatsoever until he had begun his Pearl Harbor strike. Yamamoto agreed and cautioned Kondo: 'Do not begin
your operation anywhere in the southern regions until it is clear that the air strike against Hawaii has been launched.' If anyone discovered the Southern
Fleet prematurely, Kondo must change course and 'head back to Japan in adeceptive gesture to throw the British off-balance.'

"Kondo was highly skeptical of the value of the Pearl Harbor operation and intent on the success of the southern campaign. So, when Yamamoto sketched
out the Pearl Harbor picture for him, he immediately asked, 'Where will we get all the ships for such extensive operations? How can Japan afford to divide
her strength over such wide areas?' And he voiced vigorous objections to the Hawaiian venture because 'it extends beyond the capabilities of the Japanese
Navy and depends too much on innumerable factors beyond Japan's control.' But Yamamoto shushed his complaints. 'Don't worry,' he said. 'I will furnish
you with more solid carrier strength as soon as the strike against Pearl Harbor is over.'"

And then, concerning Ozawa:

"The Southern Expeditionary Fleet (Malaya Force) was well under way, commanded by that forceful Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, who had helped organize the First Air Fleet, backed the Pearl Harbor plan, and once nourished hopes of leading the attack. His ships began hoisting anchors in Japan as early as
November 20, in small units to avoid attention."

So both Kondo and Ozawa were not only aware of the Pearl strike, but intimately involved in its planning.

For your reference, @DDM

 

[DDM]

As good a website as Combined Fleet is, it doesn't really address the question directly.

So I went and did some digging through relevant books instead. And I found the following passages in 'At Dawn We Slept'.

First, concerning Kondo.

"The task force setup used at the Nagato table maneuvers pleased no one except those responsible for the Southern Operation. And as intended, this
practice session brought to the surface a number of problems, including the urgent question of how to synchronize the Pearl Harbor venture with the
southern campaign. The vast invasion fleet with its convoys transporting thousands of troops and tons of supplies to Malaya would be under way long
before X-Day, impossible to conceal on those well-traveled sea-lanes. If British reconnaissance planes or surface craft spotted and shadowed Kondo's ships,
should the Japanese ignore the scouts or shoot them down?

"Naturally Kondo would prefer to knock out any Allied scouts before they could relay his position to their headquarters, but on this point Nagumo was
adamant. He insisted that there be no hostilities whatsoever until he had begun his Pearl Harbor strike. Yamamoto agreed and cautioned Kondo: 'Do not begin
your operation anywhere in the southern regions until it is clear that the air strike against Hawaii has been launched.' If anyone discovered the Southern
Fleet prematurely, Kondo must change course and 'head back to Japan in adeceptive gesture to throw the British off-balance.'

"Kondo was highly skeptical of the value of the Pearl Harbor operation and intent on the success of the southern campaign. So, when Yamamoto sketched
out the Pearl Harbor picture for him, he immediately asked, 'Where will we get all the ships for such extensive operations? How can Japan afford to divide
her strength over such wide areas?' And he voiced vigorous objections to the Hawaiian venture because 'it extends beyond the capabilities of the Japanese
Navy and depends too much on innumerable factors beyond Japan's control.' But Yamamoto shushed his complaints. 'Don't worry,' he said. 'I will furnish
you with more solid carrier strength as soon as the strike against Pearl Harbor is over.'"

And then, concerning Ozawa:

"The Southern Expeditionary Fleet (Malaya Force) was well under way, commanded by that forceful Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, who had helped organize the First Air Fleet, backed the Pearl Harbor plan, and once nourished hopes of leading the attack. His ships began hoisting anchors in Japan as early as
November 20, in small units to avoid attention."

So both Kondo and Ozawa were not only aware of the Pearl strike, but intimately involved in its planning.

For your reference, @DDM

Thanks had not seen that. Makes me wonder did the pilots flying CAP have orders or just act aggressively like many junior officers in the Japanese military were prone to do regardless of orders. Also interesting butterfly for another story of what happens if they obey orders and the pbys tracks and reports on the invasion fleet for the rest of the day.

 

[Butchpfd]

Very problematic. If Kimmel & Short got 30 minutes warning by finding there was a sub attack, would they assume an air attack is coming? If the radar sighting is taken seriously 40-50 fighters might get into the air and gain some altitude to meet the incoming attack. Manned AA guns could make a big difference, but everything depends on Kimmel & Short predicting an air attack. Short thought the danger was from sabotage and so lined up planes on the runways, making everything easy for the Japanese.

IMO, In all probability if the 14th Naval District with the submarine warning, and the Ward's attack takes action, they would call a submarine alert, and the ready DD would get undererway to join the Ward, and the remainder of the ready division, on 30 min alert , would come to full power and prepare to get uderway,, and the other 4 DDs in the squadron would come to 30 minute alert.
Patrol Wing 2 on Ford Island would wake up ready crews to launch at 1st light to support the DDs, and the Duty PBY already in the air.
Other ships wouldd start to come to Condition I, or Condition Zed as per ships standing orders, as the ship'?