Malaya What If

[Fatboy Coxy]

Don't forget that some of the positions will be filled by Indian officers, both those with full King's Commissions (KCIOs) and VCOs. So the British officers noted in the chapter wouldn't be the only officers in the battery.

Hi FriendlyGhost, yes there are those as well, but it comes back to my point that if the majority of the newly raised Indian HAA regts are staffed by southern Indian troops, they will have a lot of new recruits and few that are experienced to promote, so have a need, for now, for some British Officers. I have written about ex HKSRA being transferred in, but just like the regular Indian Army, they will be Muslim or Sikh. So, to my mind, and unless someone tells me differently, are only a temporary measure until Hindu KCO's and VCO's can be trained and commissioned. The more I write about these AA forces, the more I realise I haven't explained their staffing issues to you properly. The one saving grace is, these units aren't expected to be in the field, designated for rear area deployment. And as my story on them unfolds, you can see how that the wheels on that idea are quickly coming off. Any road, I'll stumble along with the poor cast of British officers, a few ex HKSRA NCO's and warrant officers, who are Muslim, and a very raw body of Hindu's, who, I will emphasise, are volunteers, who with time and training, can be good troops. And in time, like a lot of the Indian Army, will be Indianized, officered by Indian's of their own ethnic group.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Wednesday 03 December;

They were met in the Singapore Straits by HMS Giang Bee, another small coaster taken up into naval service as an auxiliary anti-submarine patrol craft, and led through the minefields and booms up to the Naval Base. The two Dutch submarines O-19 and O-20, of the 4th Division, were modern, the biggest in their fleet, designed for general use, as opposed to just operating in coastal waters. As a result, they had long-range endurance, were deep diving, and an offensive capability of 40 mines, as well as eight torpedo tubes, in addition they were the first submarines to be equipped with a submarine snorkel that allowed them to run their diesel engines while submerged. They had both been in Dutch East Indies waters for nearly two years now, and despite some new replacements, the crews were well trained and experienced.

Sailing with them was the Zuiderkruis, A Dutch Government Marine ship, which had been converted from a cable layer into a submarine tender, equipped with a couple of 3-ton cranes, capable of refuelling and resupplying munitions, stores and food, although she lacked the repair facilities and different workshops required to overhaul or repair submarines. For defence she was equipped with a couple of Krupp 75mm/L40 AA guns, but these were needing replacement, owing to an extreme shortage of ammunition, along with four newly install WWI era 0.30 machineguns.

Their arrival was part of the pre-agreed plan for the deployment of Allied submarines, whose implementation had recently been invoked. The two submarines were joining the 4th Submarine Flotilla, coming under the operational control of the Royal Navy. They had both previously trained with Royal Naval ships, having completed a two monthly deployment, and again would be picking up a Dutch speaking RN liaison officer, to sail with them.

The Royal Navy planned to have them work with HMS Regulus, who was already on station, forming a picket line northeast of the Poulo Condore Islands, in a line starting 30 miles off the mouth of the Co Chien river, the subs spaced 20 miles apart, in a south easterly direction. They would refuel and resupply today, before leaving early tomorrow morning to join HMS Regulus, expecting to arrive by Sunday 7th.

This wasn’t something Captain Longsdon, commander of the 4th Submarine Flotilla was at all happy about, operating a submarine picket line so close to an enemy coast line was extremely dangerous, and not sustainable, but in discussions with the Naval Planning staff, it had been appreciated that Japanese convoys would hug the French Indo-China coast, and a successful intervention could have a massive impact right at the beginning of any war with Japan. Accepting that this was to be a one-off scenario, and that the submarines would then fall back to targeting tankers and supply ships, he agreed to the deployments.

HMS Rover was also earmarked for this role, but would remain on anti-submarine warfare training in the Singapore Straits for the time being. In Hong Kong HMS Rainbow had been recalled at the end of last month and replenished, before being sent to patrol off Mako Island, while HMS Regent had sailed a few days ago, and was now patrolling off Hainan Island.

The Zuiderkruis was going to tie up alongside HMS Whang Pu, the Flotilla depot ship, and transfer torpedoes, mines and other essential supplies, enabling the servicing of the Dutch submarines. She was also carrying about thirty Dutch sailors, who would be staying to receive ASDIC or signalling training within the Royal Navy establishment. They would have Zuiderkruis unloaded in the next couple of days, she was scheduled to return to Soerabaja on Monday, escorted by the Dutch minelayer HNLMS Gouden Leeuw, provided the fitting of her ASDIC had been completed. The minelayer would have to forgo ASW training, as she was desperately needed to lay new defensive minefields.

The other three Dutch divisions were also being deployed, the 2nd Div (K-XI, K-XII, & K-XIII) were ordered to patrol the Karimata Straits, between Belitung Island and Borneo, the 3rd Div (K-XIV, K-XV & K-XVI) to patrol the Makassar Straits off Tarakan, and the 1st Submarine Division to patrol south of Celebes Island, O-16 and K-XVII set sail, while K-XVIII, which was having an overhaul in Soerabaja, wouldn’t be joining them until about a week later.

 

[Driftless]

We can hope for a couple (or more) encounters like the ORP Orzel had off Norway during the 1940 invasion. Of course, the Rules of Engagement are different - for now....

 

[kelgar04]

If memory serves the Dutch Subs did very well for themselves in the far east and with more coordination between the RN and the Dutch it will be a major bonus for the war effort.

 

[Nevarinemex]

If memory serves the Dutch Subs did very well for themselves in the far east and with more coordination between the RN and the Dutch it will be a major bonus for the war effort.

Did the ABDAFLOAT (ABDAUNDER?)transmit daily skeds? Or will that be beyond their capabilities? If there was a way to collate daily sighting information and then broadcast it to various type commands, it could be useful. Increase the toll of Sunkenseaboaten in the task areas. Disrupt the IJN activities early and often then see how it plays out,

 

[HJ Tulp]

Did the ABDAFLOAT (ABDAUNDER?)transmit daily skeds? Or will that be beyond their capabilities? If there was a way to collate daily sighting information and then broadcast it to various type commands, it could be useful. Increase the toll of Sunkenseaboaten in the task areas. Disrupt the IJN activities early and often then see how it plays out,

There was no ABDAFLOAT until January '42. Furthermore, because the Britons organized ABDACOM the Dutch floatplanes were cut out of the naval command structure and place under ABDAIR. Because of that their sightings were first passed up the ABDAIR command chain upto ABDACOM and then downwards through ABDAFLOAT. By the time the intel reached naval units it was often to late.

@Fatboy Coxy : is the picketline more to the coast than OTL? I wonder if the minefields the Japanese placed near Malaya are going to be more or less of an influence than OTL in the case.

 

[Parma]

The other three Dutch divisions were also being deployed, the 2nd Div (K-XI, K-XII, & K-XIII) were ordered to patrol the Karimata Straits, between Belitung Island and Borneo, the 3rd Div (K-XIV, K-XV & K-XVI) to patrol the Makassar Straits off Tarakan, and the 1st Submarine Division to patrol south of Celebes Island, O-16 and K-XVII set sail, while K-XVIII, which was having an overhaul in Soerabaja, wouldn’t be joining them until about a week later.

You leave the Dutch submarine divisions in place as fighting units

 

[Parma]

There was no ABDAFLOAT until January '42. Furthermore, because the Britons organized ABDACOM the Dutch floatplanes were cut out of the naval command structure and place under ABDAIR. Because of that their sightings were first passed up the ABDAIR command chain upto ABDACOM and then downwards through ABDAFLOAT. By the time the intel reached naval units it was often to late.

@Fatboy Coxy : is the picketline more to the coast than OTL? I wonder if the minefields the Japanese placed near Malaya are going to be more or less of an influence than OTL in the case.

It seems that the Dutch Navy Floatplanes (X-boats) are not part of ABDAIR as far as I understood last post and are still an intergrated part of the Dutch Navy/submarines, communication structure.
Since ABDAFLOAT is not in exsistence since OTL Jan.'42 , ABDAIR did not exsist by this time as well.

 

[Nevarinemex]

There was no ABDAFLOAT until January '42. Furthermore, because the Britons organized ABDACOM the Dutch floatplanes were cut out of the naval command structure and place under ABDAIR. Because of that their sightings were first passed up the ABDAIR command chain upto ABDACOM and then downwards through ABDAFLOAT. By the time the intel reached naval units it was often to late.

@Fatboy Coxy : is the picketline more to the coast than OTL? I wonder if the minefields the Japanese placed near Malaya are going to be more or less of an influence than OTL in the case.

I like your flow chart. It appears that it will be beyond the ABDA capabilities, when the Makassar Strait/Celebes Sea begins to heat up January
1942. I was hoping that the British and Dutch had progressed to a point where they were ironing out the intercept, relay, share, distribute format
of information. They at least had been at war for a couple of years together.

I'm impressed. Hawaii, PI had a convoluted system where early warnings, either at sea or in the air realm was made worse by the inattention of
local commanders.

 

[Parma]

I was hoping that the British and Dutch had progressed to a point where they were ironing out the intercept, relay, share, distribute format
of information. They at least had been at war for a couple of years together.

As I read the last post the communication is ironed out in a very efficient way in this TL, contrary to OTL with all kind of commands who are in between the observation units and the the executing units. ABDOCOM, ABDAFLOAT, ABDAIR splintered the information stream and observations in stead of streamlining things.
In this TL the Royal Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy simply put bi-language liansons officers on each other bridges, and several ships of both navies are put in one unit and conducting training with each other since months. The RNN sailors are even introduced in ASDIC training. I hope the Dutch submariners are also familiarised with ASDIC since this active sonar appereared to be a scary experience when encountered for the first time.... especially since the earie pings were followed by depth charge explosions.

 

[JWilly48519]

How soon in the history of active sonar did Allied submarines begin to be equipped with fake-ping-echo audio generators, to confuse the searchers' sonar operators?

 

[HJ Tulp]

I hope the Dutch submariners are also familiarised with ASDIC since this active sonar appereared to be a scary expereince when encountered for the first time.... especially since the earie pings were followed by depth charge explosions.

OTL The RNN considered the short-range roedel-tactic as suicide once they started to practice with ASDIC, as its efficiency was grossly overstated.

 

[Parma]

OTL The RNN considered the short-range roedel-tactic as suicide once they started to practice with ASDIC, as its efficiency was grossly overstated.

I was not aware it was ASDIC, what tipped the balance aigainst the short range tactic. I thought the submarine men figured it out earlier that this short range was very close to suïcide

 

[Butchpfd]

I like your flow chart. It appears that it will be beyond the ABDA capabilities, when the Makassar Strait/Celebes Sea begins to heat up January
1942. I was hoping that the British and Dutch had progressed to a point where they were ironing out the intercept, relay, share, distribute format
of information. They at least had been at war for a couple of years together.

I'm impressed. Hawaii, PI had a convoluted system where early warnings, either at sea or in the air realm was made worse by the inattention of
local commanders.

The irony here is, pre outbreak, the American and Dutch pilots and commanders, were In regular, if semi official, communications between the American PBYs based on the AVD William B Preston, based at Davo, Mindanao and Dutch aircraft flying out of Tarakan and Sulawesi, since patrol sectors overlapped.

 

[HJ Tulp]

I was not aware it was ASDIC, what tiped the balance aigainst the short range tactic. I thought the submarine men figured it out earlier that this short range was very close to suïcide

It was mentioned in Anten. I'm sure I translated it in a different thread some time ago but right now I'm unable to find it. From what I recall the difference could be summarised as previously it was considered suicide to get out of a convoy after an attack, while now it was considered suicide to get into a convoy in the first place. This gave the already preeminent cruiser-lobby the ammunition for the final push against the submarine-arm.

 

[HJ Tulp]

It was mentioned in Anten. I'm sure I translated it in a different thread some time ago but right now I'm unable to find it. From what I recall the difference could be summarised as previously it was considered suicide to get out of a convoy after an attack, while now it was considered suicide to get into a convoy in the first place. This gave the already preeminent cruiser-lobby the ammunition for the final push against the submarine-arm.

I now understand why I couldn't find the translation in a different thread. It was because I had posted it in this thread!

"
Only in march 1941 could the [Dutch] submarines in the Indies practice against British active sonar and the ‘pings’ hit the submarine service thundering. They confirmed [commander of the submarines] Bussemakers worries. His predecessor, J.A. de Gelder had written a report on these exercises. In it the active British sonar was given a maximum range of 2.300 meters, though it also made clear that the range would drop to 1.500 if the submarine was pinged not on it’s side but aft or fore. De Gelders conclusions show a certain amount of tunnelvision: the incapability to relate the results of these exercises to other situations and circumstances. This could be the result of the dogma of the School of Furstner (of which he was part of): that submarines were made old-fashioned by sonar. In any way, De Gelder didn’t see that these exercises were unfit to make realistic conclusions. Because of this interpretation he had no choice but to recommend attacks at 3,000 meters or more. After publication such attacks were planned more often but at that range the lack of modern aimtechnology [?] was clear. The exercises also showed that there was ample opportunity to avoid attack and break contact. Despite this De Gelder concluded that ‘experience learned that a submarine which was detected had a 50% chance of being lost.’ This was even more than the British ‘peacetime succeses’ of 30 to 40%. He didn’t realise that the chance of destroying a submarine in warconditions was massively overstated in his report.

The recommendations of De Gelder were dated 8 april 1941, but seem to be from years before. The British had concluded shortly after the declaration of war in September 1939 that their trust in active sonar was badly misplaced. They soon discovered that a maximum range of 1,200 meter was much more realistic. Before the war, the wisdom that a submarine could avoid or counter a sonar attack in 9 out of 10 times, was only known among a small group of British sonarexperts . Given that such an attack would not always be succesful, the real chance of succes if probably not more than a few percents.

[…]

Stated foremost that the Dutch shortrange-attack was only used when it was needed – so against transportfleets, battleships and carriers – there was not reason to change the doctrine. American wolfpacks had great succes because of the shortrange attack. Thankfully Dutch pessimism regarding modern anti-submarine warfare couldn’t overcome their doctrine which was taking account terrible loses to their own force, which allowed Bussemaker and others later that year to gain fame with their resoluteness in attack. Devoid of German and apparently British experiences he and De Gelder overestimated active sonar. Because of the start of the Pacific War Bussemaker was never abe to complete the reform of the wolfpack-divisiontactic. It is telling though, that his last wolfpack exercise and his own attacks on the Japanese forces were at night."

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

There was no ABDAFLOAT until January '42. Furthermore, because the Britons organized ABDACOM the Dutch floatplanes were cut out of the naval command structure and place under ABDAIR. Because of that their sightings were first passed up the ABDAIR command chain upto ABDACOM and then downwards through ABDAFLOAT. By the time the intel reached naval units it was often to late.

@Fatboy Coxy : is the picketline more to the coast than OTL? I wonder if the minefields the Japanese placed near Malaya are going to be more or less of an influence than OTL in the case.

Hi HJ Tulp, your quite correct about ABDA, and I'll leave it until 1942 before I try and tackle that mess!

Regarding British/Dutch submarine picket lines, historically there were no British subs in theatre until much later. The Dutch II Div was deployed in the Gulf of Siam, (subs K-XI, K-XII and K-XIII) along with K-XVII, and had some success, while O-19 and O-20 were patrolling the Karimata Straits. I've adopted a different strategy with a picket line positioned to intercept the invasion force earlier if required.

Hold that thought on the Japanese minefields

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

It seems that the Dutch Navy Floatplanes (X-boats) are not part of ABDAIR as far as I understood last post and are still an intergrated part of the Dutch Navy/submarines, communication structure.
Since ABDAFLOAT is not in exsistence since OTL Jan.'42 , ABDAIR did not exsist by this time as well.

Hi Parma, yes both X-boats and all Dutch subs except O-19 and O-20 are still under Dutch control, and defending the main invasion routes of the DEI, as was their defence plan.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

How soon in the history of active sonar did Allied submarines begin to be equipped with fake-ping-echo audio generators, to confuse the searchers' sonar operators?

Hi JWilly48519, What? please enlighten me, I know nothing of this

 

[JWilly48519]

1. WWII hunter sends out a PING. Hunter expects to hear a much quieter ping-echo back, from the PING bouncing off the hunted-sub. The time between PING and ping-echo gives the range, since sound travels in water at known speed. (Yes, we now know that there are lots of variations in sound speed in water depending on temperature, salinity, depth, and all of those parameters vary in the 3D environment around the hunter and hunted-sub...but without that knowledge in the early days, the echo-return time defined a distance from hunter to hunted-sub. If the hunter obtained several plots of PING-to-ping-echo time and therefore range, while the hunter was moving, the hunted-sub's location quickly could be plotted.)

2. But an audio system on board the hunted-sub could listen for a PING, then immediately send out a random series of simulated ping-echos. Or, if the hunted-sub could determine when the hunter might send out the next PING, the hunted-sub could send out a random series of simulated ping-echos before the PING arrived. The first technique might cause confusion among the hunter's sonar operators, trying to measure the PING-to-ping-echo time and arrive at ranges and therefore a location. The second technique certainly would cause confusion, but has its own weaknesses since it requires guessing when the PING will arrive.

I've read in the past that that was done by both sides later in the war. I don't know when it began. But it's a pretty obvious countermeasure-technique. Anybody that could develop a sonar system, could develop such a countermeasure.