Malaya What If

[Fatboy Coxy]

As Cryhavoc101, points out Japanese design philosophy given the constraints that they were operating under, optimised lightness of construction. This made best use for the limited supplies of strategic materials available, and the comparatively low power engines that were available. And had the advantage of giving Japanese aircraft much greater range than their European/American contemporaries. Unfortunately not having a pier one opponent, they didn’t gain the combat experience that their European contemporaries did and hence why the Americans who only had second hand information were slower in incorporating air armour and self sealing fuel tanks. The opening round of the conflict will provide a mixed message, with Japanese aircraft being as good or better than the American aircraft they face. But against the British, the combination of only slightly inferior aircraft flown mostly by experienced pilots, and a comparatively well developed air defence system, they are going to in for a tremendous shock. And they have the problem that the British aircraft are only going to get better, as the Hurricanes are replaced by Spitfires, and the various American aircraft with the North American Mustang. As long as the British can withstand the initial assault, the Japanese will face the same problem that they did IOTL Burma, as their aircraft become increasingly obsolete in the face of the ever improving Allied aircraft, until they have lost the battle for the airspace.

RR.

Hi Ramp-Rat, I feel I need to put the breaks on you, the way this is going, it will all be over by Christmas. The majority of the British and Commonwealth pilots are newly trained, led by men who have experienced combat, mostly in the BoB. They will need nurturing, looking after. Secondly, I can't see any upgrade to Spitfire in the near future, the best might be some P-40's. As to the Mustang, I don't think that comes along operationally until 1943, this timeline is until June 1942 at best, quite possibly earlier.

But, as it's been said before, the British do have some substantial factors in their favour. Radar, if installed and working ok, is a major force multiplying. Secondly, home based in Malaya, they enjoy far better recovery, repair and good old maintenance facilities, as well as parachuting pilot recovery. Which leads us to a very attritional campaign, where the ability to reinforce becomes very important. In my opinion, both the IJA and IJN air forces were bled almost white in the battles over New Guinea and the Solomon's, but can the same be done, 6-8 months earlier?

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/3-inch_anti-aircraft_gun_M3&ved=2ahUKEwiNhJmvm7KAAxWknWoFHftgDukQFnoECBQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3waCE7DzpHC4s4olNptx2U

This is Wikipedia I know but it supports what I have always read that the guns had a 20000 ft max range. I had also read there were problems with the ammo that prevented being able to reach that altitude. If I can find it I will post it.

Hi DDM, thank you for that. See the Wikipedia entry for the QF 3-inch 20 cwt, and although the range is 22k- 23.5k, effective range is 16,000 ft. For Japanese aircraft operating at say 18,000 ft its more of a nuisance. Of course the other thing to remember is not only does your bombing become less accurate at higher altitudes, but you have to start using oxygen, which is a hassle!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

The presence of these 3" AA guns could go beyond what they accomplish materially. Their presence and sound of them firing at the Japanese aircraft would have a morale impact as well, on both civilians and soldiers.

The theme of this TL has been relatively small changes, while materially and number wise situation is somewhat better, but there are also other factors to consider. The higher morale, both of officers and men, which comes from Gort's leadership, focus on training and preparedness, actual sense of purpose... As those additional troops, aircraft, vehicle, guns, material add up, these "soft" factors also must be considered.

Great work, keep it up.

Hi Triune Kingdom, part of my family come from Edmonton, just north (or norf if your a Londoner like me) of Tottenham, London. During the Blitz, a railcar mounted AA gun used to come along the railway track that run along the back of their house, and bang away at the German's. They couldn't sleep when it was around, but it did provide some assurance, and like you said was good for morale.

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

The problem is that the RN is stretched too thin - and loses 5 capital ships in the last 2 months weeks of 1941 - Prince of Wales, Barham, Repulse sunk, Queen Elizabeth and Valiant damaged; plus Ark Royal sunk; plus several other major vessels under repair or being commissioned. Without a strong fleet holding Singapore long-term is a challenge.

Air power is easier to strengthen, but losses in Crusader will be a factor. I suspect holding Burma is possible but then Churchill will keep insisting on Culverin.

Hi Aber, it's a very difficult one, can they pick one, and let the other go. Any suggestion of giving up Singapore will raise merry hell with the Australians. Or do they try and hold both, and lose both? I think part of the answer is what can the Americans do early, preferably in the Dutch East Indies, which means the USN taking some very considerable risks!

 

[Fatboy Coxy]

1941, Wednesday 22 October;

The twin engined aircraft came out of the cloud and into sunlight. The intercom crackled, the pilot, Captain Ikeda, Commanding Officer of the 50th Independent Reconnaissance Chutai, informing him they were over Kota Bharu, look over to the right, and as the aircraft banked, the airfield came into view, creeping out from under the wing. He’d tried this two days ago, and had seen nothing, the heavy rain clouds obscuring his view, but persistence had paid off. He looked down at a big long airstrip, half a dozen aircraft parked alongside, several huts scattered about, a couple of large towers, no doubt radio masts, just on the northern edge. The pilot straightened up and cameras clicked away, then they were done, the pilot turning the aircraft into a south easterly direction.

Less than 10 minutes later, they did it again, Gong Kedah, and again another big airfield, a number of huts, and a few aircraft, not as many as Kota Bharu, but nevertheless an impressive airfield. The pilot banked left and told him to look carefully, could he see the two aircraft struggling to climb up to meet them. He couldn’t at first, but as the pilot talked him through it, so he could first see them and after the pilot had made a level pass, cameras clicking again, a second banking manoeuvre revealed them much closer, the roundels of the RAF now visible on their wings.

He had a third British airfield on the list now crossed off, Machang, which they’d visited earlier, confirming what intelligence had told him, work had stopped before a strip had been cleared or the trail to it widened. He’d seen enough, and having earlier seen the airfields at Songkhla and Pattani, he was finished. He told the pilot they were done, and the aircraft turned into a north easterly direction. As they did so, the pilot calmly pointed out another two aircraft struggling to close from their left. With a little laugh he explained they couldn’t be caught; the Type 100 was far too good for them. Tsuji watched them fall behind, and as the plane headed out over the sea towards what they called home, the big new airfield at Konpong Trach, Cambodia, a smile formed on his face, he was content.

 

[Merrick]

Hi Aber, it's a very difficult one, can they pick one, and let the other go. Any suggestion of giving up Singapore will raise merry hell with the Australians. Or do they try and hold both, and lose both? I think part of the answer is what can the Americans do early, preferably in the Dutch East Indies, which means the USN taking some very considerable risks!

Sadly for Singapore, barring some major butterflies USN strategy will be the same as it was OTL, which is to fall back and regroup in the Eastern and Southern Pacific and prepare a methodical advance once sufficient forces are available and not to get drawn into a hopeless fight in the IJN's back yard. Once Manila Bay and Davao are lost, expect the USN to pretty much disappear from the Malaya/East Indies/South China Sea picture, apart from whatever Asiatic Fleet remnants are already there.

From the American perspective, defending the DEI comes a very long way behind defending the Philippines, and if the Philippines are lost the DEI are indefensible anyway, so why waste forces on a hopeless gesture? And as far as far as the USN planners go, the Philippines are expected to fall, and anything NW of a line Hawaii-Samoa-New Caledonia-Brisbane is pretty much written off.

 

[Unknown]

Sadly for Singapore, barring some major butterflies USN strategy will be the same as it was OTL, which is to fall back and regroup in the Eastern and Southern Pacific and prepare a methodical advance once sufficient forces are available and not to get drawn into a hopeless fight in the IJN's back yard. Once Manila Bay and Davao are lost, expect the USN to pretty much disappear from the Malaya/East Indies/South China Sea picture, apart from whatever Asiatic Fleet remnants are already there.

From the American perspective, defending the DEI comes a very long way behind defending the Philippines, and if the Philippines are lost the DEI are indefensible anyway, so why waste forces on a hopeless gesture? And as far as far as the USN planners go, the Philippines are expected to fall, and anything NW of a line Hawaii-Samoa-New Caledonia-Brisbane is pretty much written off.

Singapore, even if it does fall (and the chances of it falling is lower, as @Ramp-Rat pointed out, though it's still there), is not going to fall in February of 1942--it's going to happen a couple of months later than OTL, methinks. And, because it's not going to fall in February of 1942, that's going to have knock-on effects on future Japanese advances in Burma, since I suspect Japanese losses are going to be higher than OTL--losses that they cannot afford in the long run.

And, going on from this, if Japanese advances into Burma are delayed because of the delayed fall of Singapore, this'll mean that the Allies will have more of Burma in TTL, since any likely Japanese efforts are going to be delayed by the 1942 monsoon season--and, if the Allies have more of Burma in TTL (as I suspect), this'll have an effect on the OTL Bengal famine of 1943; the death toll is likely lower in that case...

 

[jlckansas]

As Cryhavoc101, points out Japanese design philosophy given the constraints that they were operating under, optimised lightness of construction. This made best use for the limited supplies of strategic materials available, and the comparatively low power engines that were available. And had the advantage of giving Japanese aircraft much greater range than their European/American contemporaries. Unfortunately not having a pier one opponent, they didn’t gain the combat experience that their European contemporaries did and hence why the Americans who only had second hand information were slower in incorporating air armour and self sealing fuel tanks. The opening round of the conflict will provide a mixed message, with Japanese aircraft being as good or better than the American aircraft they face. But against the British, the combination of only slightly inferior aircraft flown mostly by experienced pilots, and a comparatively well developed air defence system, they are going to in for a tremendous shock. And they have the problem that the British aircraft are only going to get better, as the Hurricanes are replaced by Spitfires, and the various American aircraft with the North American Mustang. As long as the British can withstand the initial assault, the Japanese will face the same problem that they did IOTL Burma, as their aircraft become increasingly obsolete in the face of the ever improving Allied aircraft, until they have lost the battle for the airspace.

RR.

It is not the Mustang the Japanese need to worry about, it is the P38, the Hellcat, the Corsair, the B25 Gunship, the Dauntless and Avenger and finally the B29.

 

[Belisarius II]

As Cryhavoc101, points out Japanese design philosophy given the constraints that they were operating under, optimised lightness of construction. This made best use for the limited supplies of strategic materials available, and the comparatively low power engines that were available. And had the advantage of giving Japanese aircraft much greater range than their European/American contemporaries. Unfortunately not having a pier one opponent, they didn’t gain the combat experience that their European contemporaries did and hence why the Americans who only had second hand information were slower in incorporating air armour and self sealing fuel tanks. The opening round of the conflict will provide a mixed message, with Japanese aircraft being as good or better than the American aircraft they face. But against the British, the combination of only slightly inferior aircraft flown mostly by experienced pilots, and a comparatively well developed air defence system, they are going to in for a tremendous shock. And they have the problem that the British aircraft are only going to get better, as the Hurricanes are replaced by Spitfires, and the various American aircraft with the North American Mustang. As long as the British can withstand the initial assault, the Japanese will face the same problem that they did IOTL Burma, as their aircraft become increasingly obsolete in the face of the ever improving Allied aircraft, until they have lost the battle for the airspace.

RR.

I don't know who is in for a bigger shock. The RAF pilots have very little experience dealing with fighters that are more maneuverable than themselves. They found themselves in this situation against Italian Biplanes and learned to use their speed advantage. In this case a Hurricane IIC is only slightly faster in level flight with a slower climb rate against a Ki-27 Nate, or Ki-43 Oscar. In the vertical they're at a distinct disadvantage. They ended up having to strip their Hurricane's to have any chance. The Allies are also heavily outnumbered, and nothing has happened to change that. Spitfires aren't getting into theater till mid 1943, and I don't think any Mustangs got there till early 1944. Till then the Allies have to make do with P-40 Warhawks.

 

[Belisarius II]

Hi DDM, thank you for that. See the Wikipedia entry for the QF 3-inch 20 cwt, and although the range is 22k- 23.5k, effective range is 16,000 ft. For Japanese aircraft operating at say 18,000 ft its more of a nuisance. Of course the other thing to remember is not only does your bombing become less accurate at higher altitudes, but you have to start using oxygen, which is a hassle!

Once pilots go over 10,000 feet, they go on oxygen anyway. So, if you're at 12,000 ft or 20,000 it makes no difference from that perspective. It is a lot colder at 20,000. The rule of thumb is for every 1,000 ft temps drop about 3 degrees Fahrenheit so, that adds to crew fatigue. The IJNAF made a mess of Clark Field, and Cavite Naval Base from 20,000 ft. Many factors can affect bombing accuracy, the most obvious is visibility, and then wind. Weather is a fickle thing.

 

[jlckansas]

You don't need P51's to take on the IJN/IJA aircraft. Even the F4F Wildcat, Hurricane, and P40 if flown in the correct way beats them easily. Look at what the Cactus Airforce did in the Southwest Pacific area with the aircraft they had. Imagine if they are able to get things like the Thatch weave and such going sooner or listen to Chennault from what they are saying is happening in China.

The P51 is not the end all be all, it gets all the fanboy but other aircraft are just as good if not better in the Pacific. Personnally if I had to have a later war aircraft in the Pacific theater I would want the Corsair, Hellcat, P47D,M, or N model, F7F Tigercat, Spitfire later models and the P38.

 

[Driftless]

If there's more than a hint of Commonwealth fighter cover over the upcountry Malayan battlefield, I can't imagine that Japanese tactical air power would be as effective.

If the Japanese air forces are attacking Singapore city, even at 15-20,000 feet in coherent formations, then general damage is going to be great(I understand 1941 Singapore was very densely built), but hitting specific targets will be literal hit and miss, miss, miss, etc. With any kind of aerial defense of the cities, then coherent bomber formations are going to be difficult, IMO

 

[jlckansas]

If there's more than a hint of Commonwealth fighter cover over the upcountry Malayan battlefield, I can't imagine that Japanese tactical air power would be as effective.

If the Japanese air forces are attacking Singapore city, even at 15-20,000 feet in coherent formations, then general damage is going to be great(I understand 1941 Singapore was very densely built), but hitting specific targets will be literal hit and miss, miss, miss, etc. With any kind of aerial defense of the cities, then coherent bomber formations are going to be difficult, IMO

Will they be as better than Bomber Command and hit the city they aim at or might hit somewhere else?

 

[Driftless]

Will they be as better than Bomber Command and hit the city they aim at or might hit somewhere else?

Good point, though I'd think that the Island of Singapore should be identifiable at night even in one of the darker moon phases, especially early war with probably inconsistent observation of blackout regs, plus some reflection off of the water of the Straits. Bad weather throws those ideas out the window though.

Moon Phases - Dec 1941

 

[Butchpfd]

Hi Butchpfd, I think the best we can hope of the 3-inch AA gun, is it keeps the Japanese honest.

At best keep honest. With Mac Arthur stealing the search radar from Cavite it make sit far worse. If Cavite had it's
radar perhaps the 2 P-40's could have gotten above the bombers let alone trying to get to their altitude.

 

[Butchpfd]

Hi Aber, it's a very difficult one, can they pick one, and let the other go. Any suggestion of giving up Singapore will raise merry hell with the Australians. Or do they try and hold both, and lose both? I think part of the answer is what can the Americans do early, preferably in the Dutch East Indies, which means the USN taking some very considerable risks!

OTL The Asiatic Fleet lost it's only heavy Cruiser, both of it's2 light Cruisers crippled one a major hull damage, and one barely afloat, 5 of 13 destroyers, 1 of 2 gunboats ( think Rn Sloops)4 of 29 Submarines, so out of 47 surface combat vessels, 11 lost, all surviving cruisers and destroyers damaged. Asiatic Fleet Aviation, only one of the original 28 PBY's survived, along with one of the five J2Fs he USN took risks. with some success.

 

[Ltlconf]

As Cryhavoc101, points out Japanese design philosophy given the constraints that they were operating under, optimised lightness of construction. This made best use for the limited supplies of strategic materials available, and the comparatively low power engines that were available. And had the advantage of giving Japanese aircraft much greater range than their European/American contemporaries. Unfortunately not having a pier one opponent, they didn’t gain the combat experience that their European contemporaries did and hence why the Americans who only had second hand information were slower in incorporating air armour and self sealing fuel tanks. The opening round of the conflict will provide a mixed message, with Japanese aircraft being as good or better than the American aircraft they face. But against the British, the combination of only slightly inferior aircraft flown mostly by experienced pilots, and a comparatively well developed air defence system, they are going to in for a tremendous shock. And they have the problem that the British aircraft are only going to get better, as the Hurricanes are replaced by Spitfires, and the various American aircraft with the North American Mustang. As long as the British can withstand the initial assault, the Japanese will face the same problem that they did IOTL Burma, as their aircraft become increasingly obsolete in the face of the ever improving Allied aircraft, until they have lost the battle for the airspace.

RR.

The constraints were there, yes, but even once the Japanese began using powerful engines, armor, heavy guns, and self-sealing fuel tanks that superb handling and agility remained. Indeed, if anything, they got better at balancing all this out, showing that it was good engines holding them back earlier.
Seriously, I really have nothing but genuine respect for their talents, ESPECIALLY considering their constraints concerning material quality and the finicky late war engines.

What seemingly tipped the air war in the Southwest Pacific and the later Central Pacific was the P38 Lightning and improved tactics entering the AAF and Navy's squadrons playbooks in late 1942. Into 1943 the main Navy fighter was the Wildcat, yet it was holding its own, and then some, due to improved tactics, training, and the sheer toughness of the airframe. The P38 was just deadly. One short burst from the four .50s and 20mm cannon would toast a bomber, much less a fighter! Plus, again, a tough airframe that was also fast as hell, climbed like a cheetah and dived like a bird of prey. Using energy tactics it gutted the Japanese air assets in the SW Pacific. The Corsair finished them off. In the Central Pacific the Hellcat would do the same.
Add in General Kenny's willingness to throw the book out and try pretty much anything once, especially with his bombers, to see if it'd work...and you end up with a winning combination.

 

[Ltlconf]

And I agree that holding Malaya long term is unlikely, unless they can't least hold northeast Sumatra. They can seriously screw up the Japanese timetable if they seriously bruise their forces in Malaya, and slowdown the conquest of the NEI by a few weeks or hopefully a month or two. This provides an opportunity to have a orderly withdrawal of forces, proper evacuation of noncombatants, and proper destruction of any assets that must be left behind (like ammunition, oil refineries and machine shops).
And yeah, I think holding Burma is a real possibility, which I still believe is strategically vital, both for defending (and feeding) India and supplying China, as well as for it's resources (again food, plus its minerals and oil). Plus it provides a excellent forward base to retake the East Indies and Malaya years early.

 

[Ltlconf]

When the Sunda Strait falls, Singapore, even if controlled by the Commonwealth forces, becomes another Bataan. It is too far behind the Japanese controlled sea front.

Agreed, but that depends on how costly and how out of whack timeline-wise things have gotten by this point. While the Sunda Straits may be out of the question as a retreat rout: Too narrow. There are other ways to Australia, however, that may be less covered due to any non-historical losses and the ripple affects from that. I believe that overall the Japanese are going to waaay too warm a greeting this time around than historically. We can't forget that six months off running wild was as due to freakish luck combined with a level of seeming freakish bad luck on the part of the Allies combined with poor leadership and planning, as it was to indeed quality Japanese leadership, in a few locations, and planning. But we also can't forget that the Japanese plan is overly reliant on everything going right and on schedule. Once those ripples from things going wrong and off schedule start, well, I don't envy our noble OP!

 

[Ramp-Rat]

Hi Ramp-Rat, I feel I need to put the breaks on you, the way this is going, it will all be over by Christmas. The majority of the British and Commonwealth pilots are newly trained, led by men who have experienced combat, mostly in the BoB. They will need nurturing, looking after. Secondly, I can't see any upgrade to Spitfire in the near future, the best might be some P-40's. As to the Mustang, I don't think that comes along operationally until 1943, this timeline is until June 1942 at best, quite possibly earlier.

But, as it's been said before, the British do have some substantial factors in their favour. Radar, if installed and working ok, is a major force multiplying. Secondly, home based in Malaya, they enjoy far better recovery, repair and good old maintenance facilities, as well as parachuting pilot recovery. Which leads us to a very attritional campaign, where the ability to reinforce becomes very important. In my opinion, both the IJA and IJN air forces were bled almost white in the battles over New Guinea and the Solomon's, but can the same be done, 6-8 months earlier?

Sir this is your TL, and I have no desire to ether replace you as author, or force ideas on you that you are uncomfortable with. However I would like to point out for your consideration the following points. Unlike during the BoB, were the pilots basically fell into three categories, prewar regulars, prewar members of the Auxiliary Airforce, both of which were very experienced, and the very inexperienced members of the RAFVR and University Air Squadrons. And all of them were hampered by flying in vic threes and under the Dowding fighter instructions, against Germany pilots who were flying in finger fours, and were mostly combat veterans. Were as the fighter pilots in Malaysia are flying in finger fours, and led by combat veterans, even if a squadron only has 12 aircraft. The young trainers will have, thanks to the minor improvements that AVM Park has implemented, have far more flying hours on type, I would expect that by now it’s a least 40 if not more, and will have been repeated put through their paces by the more experienced leaders. And other than those who will be thrown into combat with Japanese fighters, those based in Singapore will be blooded against unescorted bombers, before eventually going on to combat with the Japanese fighters. A typical pilot under instruction, could in a four week period, only flying two hours a day excluding weekends, easily amass 40 hours of instruction. Week one, simply gaining type experience, week two practicing formation flying in the finger four formation and further type experience. Week three simple combat training and exercises, with week four a combination of one on one training with an experienced instructor in combat manoeuvres and practice interception exercises with a bomber. One of the failings of inexperienced pilots during the BoB, was the failure to judge properly the distance they were from bombers, and thus not getting close enough to make their attacks effective. Note given just how little air combat the average Japanese fighter pilot will have experienced, they too for all their extensive experience, will in many ways be just as green, and liable to make mistakes. You question whether this battle can develop into an attritional campaign like the later one IOTL, that took place further South in New Guinea and the Solomons. And I believe it can, provided the British can resist the initial attack and remain an effective air defence network, as given the far better situation on the ground, and the ability to feed into the campaign reinforcements of men and machines that they have, any attritional campaign will by default go to the British.

RR.