MWI 40112817 The Singapore Conference

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1940, Thursday 28 November;

Lord Gort turned to his adjutant, who was the minute taker and said, “Please note that John”. He looked around the big oblong table at the others seated there, the two Dutch observers, with another three behind, the various Dominion delegates, the two Australians, with again another three seated behind them, the New Zealander, another two behind him, the two Canadians, a couple of South Africans, the three from India, Layton, Percival, Park, again with others behind them all. And lastly the two Americans, also sitting purely as observers.

“I declare this conference closed, I’ll remind you all that these meetings have been held in the strictness confidence, and remember careless talk costs lives. I thank you for your participation, and I wish you all a Bon Voyage. The Governor is holding a dinner tonight and you are all cordially invited to attend, thank you Gentlemen.”

Gort sat back, satisfied that it was over, and all that could be done had been. They had started on Tuesday, and the three days had been full on, with some frank discourse, especially from the Australians, and painful though it sometimes was, it had helped focused everyone on what was needed. If Malaya was to be the shield that protected them all from the Japanese threat, then it needed serious reinforcing. And not just in troops, equipment levels were poor, and many of the sundry materials required were in short supply.

The conference had originally been planned with the Americans fully attending, but despite Roosevelt’s re-election, the Americans were very wary of making any commitment, and so had only attended as observers. That meant the Dutch, who were extremely nervous about a lack of public commitment to their security, would only attend as observers as well, holding back, awaiting a commitment to safeguard their security from Britain and the USA.

But Churchill and the COS had been good on their word, and the Dominions attended, and were wanting to help where they could. Britain’s Far East strategy was one of letting the Americans take the lead with Japan, but it had become increasingly clear not to expect them to come and defend Singapore. Therefore, they had to build a defence themselves. In the conference commitments had been made, promises given and decisions agreed.

Australia agreed to provide one brigade of the 8th Australian Division, until the air forces had been built up to a level sufficient for its redeployment. This also included all the associated units. She agreed to raise four Article XV RAAF Sqns and additional air and ground crews, along with deploying two of her own RAAF Sqns. She would re-equip the two Vildebeest Sqns with newly build Bristol Beaufort’s, once the factory had started production. The RAN would provide some escorts for convoying.

New Zealand promised to raise two Article XV RNZAF Sqns, additional air and ground crews, and provide an Airfield Construction company minus earth moving equipment. It would also provide pilots for the FAA Training Wing being formed in Singapore.

Canada would provide four Article XV RCAF Sqns and additional air and ground crews, an Airfield Construction company and enough earth moving equipment for it and the NZ unit. Additional trained operators and technicians for the Radar Network would be sent. She would also send small arms and associated munitions, assorted railway equipment and parts, steelwork and cement, and a lot of motor transport, all convoyed by the RCN, where required.

South Africa would be providing their Marmon Herrington armoured cars, 3-inch mortars and mortar bombs, a lot of .303 rounds, and would take any trainee pilots into the Joint Air Training Scheme (JATS) that Singapore care to send them. She would also send newly manufactured small military items, steelwork and supplies.

India would provide additional troops from her vastly expanding army, but these would take time to train. Ultimately, it was planned that she would provide the entire garrison for Malaya, with British Army units attached. Also, she would send munitions, supplies and stores for the Army, some small arms and foodstuffs. The RIN would be able to provide some escorts for convoying.

While the Dutch, with some agreements for arms supplies made, would exchange liaison officers, agreed to the mutual use of military airfields, with refuelling and rearming arrangements and information exchanges, including Naval ship deployments.

Help was coming, initially just a trickle, but in time that could turn to a steady stream.
 
Certainly sounds like the Japanese will be running into a far stronger defense. It was a close run thing as it was, will they and can they increase the intiatial forces to attack Malaya.
 
Certainly sounds like the Japanese will be running into a far stronger defense. It was a close run thing as it was, will they and can they increase the intiatial forces to attack Malaya.

Not really. Not without taking from somewhere else, but it's okay. After all, everyone knows the Western Democracies are weak and cowardly, who will break at the first sign of Bushido courage. Right?
 
To be honest, there have been a lot of 'What Ifs' that see Britain hold Malaya/Singapore one way or another, I'm certainly not the first, and when it comes to putting forward a new name to an historical command, whatever names I propose, will have probably been suggested before. The reduction in the size of the Hong Kong garrison was discussed by the CoS, and from a military point of view, eminently very sensible, however, as always in war, quite often a political reason overrides a purely military reason. Again I'm not the first to suggest this reduction either.

Obviously where you start your POD dictates some of what you suggest, and I've tried to start my POD as late as possible, but still hopefully having a reasonable and realistic path to achieving success. However, one thing I have learnt already, is what you think will happen doesn't always, as some 'minor thing' forces an outcome you didn't plan for. I'd like to think at the end of this story, it can be reflected on and said, yes that could have happened. I already have written most of the sections leading up to December 1941, and mapped out a lot after, but contributions sometimes make me question directions I have taken, or whether they are realistic or not. Some stuff, like the choice of Lord Gort replacing Brooke-Popham is down to individual preference, as I don't think I could possibly say I got that right.
To be fair, the Whale holding the Far East came from a situation that I dont see occurring here. The driver was a bit indirect, but starts with more RN carriers not so much beating up the Italian navy at Taranto, but crushing it. This leads to the Italians having a panic attack (at least for a short while), and that temporary paralyis gave O'Connor to be allowed to keep chasing the Italian Army west (after Taranto, an even more demoralised army). As a result, NA was in British hands by 1941.
Its probably not generally realised just how huge the British involvement in the Med was. Holding NA allows considerable forces to be diverted east (the Italian navy is at the bottom of the Med, its a British lake), so they were able to allocate the prewar forces to Singapore, as well as a seriously powerful Far Eastern Fleet. Perhaps morimportantly, able commanders were freed up to commans some of those forces.

Blamey ends up commanding part of the theatre for a number of reasons. IIRC, he was seen as more the sortof solid, old-fashioned infantry General, but that isn't such a bad theing, you arent going to be seeing any sweeping armoured battles in Malaya or the DEI... As in the Whale timeline the Australian forces in the east were quite numerous, it wouls also be seen as a politically good thing.

But the only thing that might bring about something similar here is an early fall of NA, which I don't see any drivers for so far. so I agree with the author - a few small improvements are possible, but not major change, its still going to be operating on a shoesring. Maybe a slightly bigger shoestring, but still a shoestring...
 
Who were the Americans? I assume Hart, if not him. His Chief of staff R. Adm. Purnell, or Commander of TF 5( Surface Combatants) R. Adm. Glassford? Army/ USAAC ?? Would Mac Arthur definitely to talk to the British?
 
Loving this TL.

IMHO I think it was the lack of any tanks that doomed Malaya. This deficiency meant that whenever the Japanese infantry infiltrated around and behind the Commonwealth forces and set up a road block the trapped forces couldn’t break out. Thus in turn forced the Commonwealth forces to abandon their heavier equipment. The only reason why Slim was able to retreat out of Burma in 42 was because he had an armoured brigade with him.

Tanks however are in short supply in 1941. There’s very little chance of anything half decent being sent (as these would be earmarked either for home defence or the Middle East).

There were some Matilda 1’s in the UK being used for training which could be spared (perhaps with a handful of Matilda 2’s to placate the Australia’s). Alternatively perhaps a battalion or two of Covenanter‘s Could be made available. Once everyone’s stopped laughing at this suggestion the Covie did have some important characteristics. Firstly it is just about a tank which is better than no tanks. Secondly it has a 2lbr gun With anti tank capabilities being sadly lacking for the Commonwealth forces. Thirdly it is better than the Japanese tanks used in Malaya OTL (when working). It can even be made to move occasionally! I’m aware of the overheating issues that kept it in the UK throughout the war but I suspect that this was in part with the British we’re using the tank as a high speed Cruiser tank (to be fair that’s what it was meant to be), but in Malaya it would be used more as a slow moving infantry tank which ought to help a little with this.
 
Loving this TL.

IMHO I think it was the lack of any tanks that doomed Malaya. This deficiency meant that whenever the Japanese infantry infiltrated around and behind the Commonwealth forces and set up a road block the trapped forces couldn’t break out. Thus in turn forced the Commonwealth forces to abandon their heavier equipment. The only reason why Slim was able to retreat out of Burma in 42 was because he had an armoured brigade with him.

Tanks however are in short supply in 1941. There’s very little chance of anything half decent being sent (as these would be earmarked either for home defence or the Middle East).

There were some Matilda 1’s in the UK being used for training which could be spared (perhaps with a handful of Matilda 2’s to placate the Australia’s). Alternatively perhaps a battalion or two of Covenanter‘s Could be made available. Once everyone’s stopped laughing at this suggestion the Covie did have some important characteristics. Firstly it is just about a tank which is better than no tanks. Secondly it has a 2lbr gun With anti tank capabilities being sadly lacking for the Commonwealth forces. Thirdly it is better than the Japanese tanks used in Malaya OTL (when working). It can even be made to move occasionally! I’m aware of the overheating issues that kept it in the UK throughout the war but I suspect that this was in part with the British we’re using the tank as a high speed Cruiser tank (to be fair that’s what it was meant to be), but in Malaya it would be used more as a slow moving infantry tank which ought to help a little with this.
Yes the ‘road blocks’ the Japanese used were felled trees roped together known as giant abatis and then covered with LMGs and knee mortars to prevent infantry and engineers from removing it.

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Wheeled vehicles could not cross them and neither could the universal carriers and both were vulnerable to the lighter weapons carried by the blocking forces.

The 100 Stuart tanks of 7th Armoured Brigade on the other hand being about 15 tons and virtually imperious to the weapons carried by said blocking forces allowed the British forces to retreat from Rangoon.

In Malaya lack of any tanks meant that any retreating unit finding itself blocked by such tactics either had to fight its way past said roadblock or as was often the case abandon all its heavy equipment, artillery and motor transport and sadly in many cases it’s wounded, and bypass the roadblocks on foot.

This would massively degrade the units fighting capability from that point onwards

So yes even a bad tank like the Covenanter would have a large impact on the campaign given it’s ability to breach and defeat such roadblocks

Also the tanks had radios fitted so communication between formations would be more easily maintained.

And of course the reliability issues aside the tank was better armed than the IJA tanks and quite capable of defeating them.
 
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Who were the Americans? I assume Hart, if not him. His Chief of staff R. Adm. Purnell, or Commander of TF 5( Surface Combatants) R. Adm. Glassford? Army/ USAAC ?? Would Mac Arthur definitely to talk to the British?

Since he did OTL we might assume he would in a ATL. 'Secret Allies in the Pacific' is a brief outline of the planning and cooperation between the British, Dutch, and US before 7 December 1941. Admiral Phillips was in Manilia 6th & 7th December for a conference with MacArthur, departing back to Singapore on the 7th & less than a day before the Japanese attacked Mtaylasia, Philippines, ect...
 
Yes the ‘road blocks’ the Japanese used were felled trees roped together known as giant abatis and then covered with LMGs and knee mortars to prevent infantry and engineers from removing it.

Wheeled vehicles could not cross them and neither could the universal carriers and both were vulnerable to the lighter weapons carried by the blocking forces.

The 100 Stuart tanks of 7th Armoured Brigade on the other hand being about 15 tons and virtually imperious to the weapons carried by said blocking forces allowed the British forces to retreat from Rangoon.

In Malaya lack of any tanks meant that any retreating unit finding itself blocked by such tactics either had to fight its way past said roadblock or as was often the case abandon all its heavy equipment, artillery and motor transport and sadly in many cases it’s wounded, and bypass the roadblocks on foot.

Alternately they could attack the infiltrating and flanking forces and kill them. Thats what the Australians & US Marines did a few months later on New Guinea or Guadalcanal. Of course you need well led infantry, with decent training. There are plenty of examples of the presence of tanks accomplishing little because the overall training was substandard & inferior.
 
Alternately they could attack the infiltrating and flanking forces and kill them. Thats what the Australians & US Marines did a few months later on New Guinea or Guadalcanal. Of course you need well led infantry, with decent training. There are plenty of examples of the presence of tanks accomplishing little because the overall training was substandard & inferior.
Oh totally Gash in Gash out

But having the actual option would help!
 
Actually most of the meeting was with Hart, including the fact that an American destroyer division, with tender was enroute to join Force Z, also setting firm zones for Anerican submarines to operate in.
 
While the Dutch, with some agreements for arms supplies made, would exchange liaison officers, agreed to the mutual use of military airfields, with refuelling and rearming arrangements and information exchanges, including Naval ship deployments.
I assume this agreement would only activated once war started right? :)
 
While the Dutch, with some agreements for arms supplies made, would exchange liaison officers, agreed to the mutual use of military airfields, with refuelling and rearming arrangements and information exchanges, including Naval ship deployments.
This would mean that the orders for armament, (fighter)planes and armored vehicles which were placed in the USA will get the green light from the USA gouvernment?
In OTL many order of the DEI did not get their export licence by the USA government since they were afraid the the DEI gouvrnement had the same ambivalent, untrust, attitude towards Japan as (Vichy-) French Indo-China.
 
Why...., We are neighbours Japan and not at war with you, so we are free to do what we want. And if you are upset,... what is your reason.....

OTL the DEI was very strictly neutral so as to not give Japan an excuse to invade. The government of the DEI knew that without British support they had not chance to withstand such an invasion and the Britons refused to guarantee the territorial integrity of the Dutch colony as they knew they were not strong enough without American help.
This policy was only somewhat supported by the government-in-exile in London but it was a messy situation. Constitutionally the government had no basis of being outside of the territory of the Netherlands so the Governor General in Batavia could argue that he didn't have to listen to them. He never went so far but was able to keep the Dutch East Indies strictly neutral in 1940, and somewhat neutral in 1941.
 
OTL the DEI was very strictly neutral so as to not give Japan an excuse to invade. The government of the DEI knew that without British support they had not chance to withstand such an invasion and the Britons refused to guarantee the territorial integrity of the Dutch colony as they knew they were not strong enough without American help.
This policy was only somewhat supported by the government-in-exile in London but it was a messy situation. Constitutionally the government had no basis of being outside of the territory of the Netherlands so the Governor General in Batavia could argue that he didn't have to listen to them. He never went so far but was able to keep the Dutch East Indies strictly neutral in 1940, and somewhat neutral in 1941.
Hence the reluctance of the USA to give export licences for military equipment ordered by the DEI. The DEI desire to reamain neutral only caused misunderstanding, and the suspicion the DEI would take the same position as French Indo China
 
Hence the reluctance of the USA to give export licences for military equipment ordered by the DEI. The DEI desire to reamain neutral only caused misunderstanding, and the suspicion the DEI would take the same position as French Indo China
True. With the Britons refusing to commit themselves to the defense of the colony, the GG didn't see any other choice though. If the government-in-exile tries to force him to abandon neutrality it could very well lead to a showdown, to be decided by the Queen most probably. If she - and I assume she will* - comes down on the side of the government-in-exile I think Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer (the Governor-General, this is only he last name!) could very well decide to resign. Which would open up a whole different can of worms.

* That is, if the government is lead by Gerbrandy at that point. She would never side with De Geer but he wouldn't ever be against neutrality ofcourse, being the defeatist defector he was.
 
True. With the Britons refusing to commit themselves to the defense of the colony, the GG didn't see any other choice though. If the government-in-exile tries to force him to abandon neutrality it could very well lead to a showdown, to be decided by the Queen most probably. If she - and I assume she will* - comes down on the side of the government-in-exile I think Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer (the Governor-General, this is only he last name!) could very well decide to resign. Which would open up a whole different can of worms.

* That is, if the government is lead by Gerbrandy at that point. She would never side with De Geer but he wouldn't ever be against neutrality ofcourse, being the defeatist defector he was.
It remains a strange, and theoretical position, given the, known, fact that the Japanese Empire followed a very agressive policy, the Netherlands was occupied and the government in excile alied it self with the UK. I wonder how the GG of the DEI, imagined the Japanese could see the DEI as a seperate entity. To me, in hint sight, it looked as a complete misunderstanding of the reality....
 
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It remains a strange, and theoretical position, given the, known, fact that the Japanese Empire followed a vry agressive policy, the Netherlands was occupied and the government in excile alied i self with the UK. I wonder how the GG of the DEI, imagined the Japanese would see the DEI as a seperate entity. To me, in hint sight, it looked as a complete misunderstanding of the reality....
Well it wasn't like the GG was against joining fully joining the Allies but doing so risked provoking a Japanese attack. Don't forget that in this period the Japanese took over French Indochina without Great Britain lifting a finger. The Britons even stopped French aid from reaching their beleaguered forces! And here is the DEI, which needs someone to support it incase of a Japanese attack, while Great Britain refuses to commit itself to that. What is the other option? Stalling for time. The DEI was never going to go over to the Japanese but time had to be won, until the US would join the war or at least until Britain would be back on its feet. And mind you, the strategy pretty much worked. The DEI wasn't attacked by Japan until weeks after the start of general hostilities. While the Kingdom of the Netherlands declared war on Japan even before the United States or Great Britain did, Japan still hoped that it could come to a separate agreement. Of course the biggest flaw in the strategy was that it gave the United States an excuse to divert arms shipments to the UK instead of the DEI but those wouldn't have arrived incase of a 1940 Japanese invasion anyway.
 
Well it wasn't like the GG was against joining fully joining the Allies but doing so risked provoking a Japanese attack. Don't forget that in this period the Japanese took over French Indochina without Great Britain lifting a finger. The Britons even stopped French aid from reaching their beleaguered forces! And here is the DEI, which needs someone to support it incase of a Japanese attack, while Great Britain refuses to commit itself to that. What is the other option? Stalling for time. The DEI was never going to go over to the Japanese but time had to be won, until the US would join the war or at least until Britain would be back on its feet. And mind you, the strategy pretty much worked. The DEI wasn't attacked by Japan until weeks after the start of general hostilities. While the Kingdom of the Netherlands declared war on Japan even before the United States or Great Britain did, Japan still hoped that it could come to a separate agreement. Of course the biggest flaw in the strategy was that it gave the United States an excuse to divert arms shipments to the UK instead of the DEI but those wouldn't have arrived incase of a 1940 Japanese invasion anyway.
Let’s not forget that Britain was effectively at war with Vichy France during this period.

And there was initially confusion over how influential De Gaulle was to the French colony’s

So there was very good reason why reinforcements were prevented from being sent.

Also Britain was not exactly in a great position to do anything about the invasion of FIC what with then current events in Europe and Africa
 
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