USSR gets absolute victory in the Winter War, effects on WW2.

[CaptainCalvert]

Sweden would see the Red Army on its borders as a direct threat to their existence. Then factor in the historic Swedish community in Finland (ala Mannerheim) and the Swedish speaking Aaland Islands, an autonomous part of what was Finland.

I am thinking that Sweden joins the Axis- well not fully. Rather, Sweden becomes a co-Beligerent Finnish style. As Barbarossa kicks off, the Swedish military coordinates with German war interests, but only in regards to restoring Finland as an independent nation. Restoration of an independent Finland will probably include the seizure of buffer zones of Soviet territory as well.

But, wait, there is more Nordic help coming to Germany.....

Norway already supplied a certain number of Waffen volunteers IOTL. With Finland absorbed and Sweden fighting, the Germans raise an entire plus sized division from Norwegian volunteers ala the Spanish Blue Division.

Ironically, the raising of the Norwegian Blue Division kicked off a civil war of sorts in the German High Command. Himmler, dreaming of a Division of fictionally Aryan ubber warriors of the type he never was, pulled hard for it to be formed as Waffen SS "A" Team division- not the auxiliary team Waffen.

But.... Heer commanders privately countered that a Waffen label would keep a good number of willing Norwegians from joining. In the end, pragmatism won and the Norwegian Division goes "Blue", not "Waffen".

I think your description of Sweden's response looks very reasonable.
The twist is that the Winter War was over in March 1940 OTL after heroic defence, so a complete soviet victory ITTL is likely to involve earlier breakthrough but will probably finish more or less at the same time if not over in a few weeks.

What does this mean for Norway? OTL Weserubung and allied intervention were early April and Norway hadn't mobilised. Here, it's near certain that Norway would have mobilised in response to Finland's fate, and likely be having very serious conversations with Sweden about mutual support.
Both allies and axis have an interest in supporting Norway, but this creates some interesting potential. Could we have allied-backed neutral Norway in a mutual-support agreement with German-backed neutral Sweden?
The practicalities of supply would favour UK shipping to coastal Norway, while Sweden can best be supported by Germany across the Baltic.
Then, Germany is in a bind.
They have to support Sweden or risk their steel supply, but can't tolerate allied Norway, who they can't easily supply themselves and who are an essential partner for Sweden.
But supporting Sweden and taking Norway requires much more effort than OTL Weserubung, especially if Norway is prepared and doesn't want German invention. They could invade as OTL, but this weakens Sweden's natural ally, and will tie up critical resources - materials, men and planning capacity - that OTL was directed at France. So we could see an unsuccessful or only partially successful alt- Weserubung, followed by a pre-Sickelscnitt [1] attempt on France.
None of this looks good for Germany, or for Scandinavia which would be weakened while bordering an expansionist soviet union, while any potential allies are fighting each other to exhaustion in Belgium and France.


[1] It's not that Sickelschnitt is impossible here, but if planning resources are tied up in supporting Sweden, boosting Romania, arranging an invasion against Norwegian resistance, the chances of it being as well organised and as well-resourced as OTL are much reduced. And given the number of opportunities where it could have been slowed or completely fouled up OTL, that's bad news for Germany. Conversely, tying up allied planning resources with the Scandinavian problem is likely to be a benefit to the allies if it stops Gamelin from thinking about using an army best suited to defence on rash offensives like Breda.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

A significant knock-on: The USSR would gain control of the Petsamo region in arctic Finland, where major nickel deposits were being developed by INCO, the Canadian firm that operated (and still does) the huge Sudbury mine in western Ontario. The USSR occupied Petsamo in 1939, but withdrew at the end of the war in 1940. Apparently they simply didn't care about it, and possibly Britain complained.

If the USSR takes all Finland, they will of course keep Petsamo. They may offer INCO a concession to keep Britain happy, but their troops will be there. And they should be able to hold it against German attack in 1941.

This becomes important in mid-1942, when OTL the mine started producing nickel for the Axis. In 1943, Petsamo provided about 3/4 of German nickel supplies. Loss of that would be a big hit to German production of armor plate, bearings, engines, and other key war goods.

 

[Kurd Gossemer]

A significant knock-on: The USSR would gain control of the Petsamo region in arctic Finland, where major nickel deposits were being developed by INCO, the Canadian firm that operated (and still does) the huge Sudbury mine in western Ontario. The USSR occupied Petsamo in 1939, but withdrew at the end of the war in 1940. Apparently they simply didn't care about it, and possibly Britain complained.

If the USSR takes all Finland, they will of course keep Petsamo. They may offer INCO a concession to keep Britain happy, but their troops will be there. And they should be able to hold it against German attack in 1941.

This becomes important in mid-1942, when OTL the mine started producing nickel for the Axis. In 1943, Petsamo provided about 3/4 of German nickel supplies. Loss of that would be a big hit to German production of armor plate, bearings, engines, and other key war goods.

Without Leningrad under immediate threat, I could definitely see them using the city as sort of bulwark in order to keep the gulf area secured as well as places like Petsamo a nightmare to invade, meaning that either German High Command learns to deal with less nickel or keeps trying to attack it in order to secure it and leave themselves open for a Soviet counter attack or ambush

 

[Fratsup]

I believe the entire situation would see the Soviets be even more brutal to the Baltic nations than OTL mostly due to fear of a potential of a united front/resistance against the Soviets. The population movements would probably be even larder than OTL and the general situation would see the Soviets push for more Russification of the Baltic.

Considering that Russia would also have more people due to not having to worry as much about Leningrad and the Germans will probably not get as far due to the greater ability of Soviets troops to defend the nation, the Soviets might actually push harder against the Baltic and Eastern Europe. Overall I see the Soviet Union expanding further into Eastern Europe with a greater ability to actually settle any new territory they want with the greater amount of people.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

Without Leningrad under immediate threat, I could definitely see them using the city as sort of bulwark in order to keep the gulf area secured as well as places like Petsamo a nightmare to invade, meaning that either German High Command learns to deal with less nickel or keeps trying to attack it in order to secure it and leave themselves open for a Soviet counter attack or ambush

In the absence of nickel, face hardened armour is OK, but becomes increasingly difficult to fabricate in thicker sections, so tanks have to rely more on flat plates, with no or more challenging welding, and greater risk of embrittlement. Typically, nickel improves armour performance by around 20% for comparable thickness, so while there is some scope for creative design, ultimately armour thickness (hence weight and fuel usage) must go up, tank size must reduce (which means the more powerful guns can't be used) or armour protection must decrease. None of this is good news for the German army.

But nickel is also important in engines as it retains strength and corrosion resistance at high temperatures. Given Germany also had chromium shortages, that can't be used instead and a nickel shortage could severely compromise jet engine technology. So no or fewer operational Me262. Whether that's good or bad overall, I'm not 100% sure.

 

[von Adler]

I'd expect Finland to transfer the Åland island to Sweden in an emergency session of the parliament, and establishing an exile government there (or maybe in Stockholm).

I fully expect the Germans to go for Denmark and Norway even without any Allied ideas of intervening in Finland through Narvik (in reality aiming to occupy Narvik and the Swedish ore fields) - the Kriegsmarine wanted bases and Hitler wanted to secure the North Sea shipping routes.

Swedish public opinion never forgave the Germans the invasion of Denmark and Norway, and the response to the German "crusade against bolchevism" was less than lukewarm in Sweden, to German suprise and anger. Sweden refused to allow the Germans to open recruitment offices in Sweden, and when Germany threatened to end an agreed upon observation treaty, where 50-150 Swedish officers were to be allowed to observe on the Eastern Front, Sweden considered it cancelled and informed the officers that the positioning was no longer relevant.

Sweden will not join the axis and will not join Barbarossa, even with the Soviets next door - it might allow exile Finnish troops to operate from Åland, perhaps transferring the islands back to the exile government and allow the Germans to supply and equip the exile Finnish forces.

I'd fully expect the Finns with German support to be able to liberate most of Finland during 1941 through some landings - the local support and the pressing needs on other fronts, along with the difficult terrain will make it hard for the Soviets to hold Finland, IMHO.

The big question will be how Finland is treated post-war.

 

[HunterX]

I'd expect Finland to transfer the Åland island to Sweden in an emergency session of the parliament, and establishing an exile government there (or maybe in Stockholm).

I fully expect the Germans to go for Denmark and Norway even without any Allied ideas of intervening in Finland through Narvik (in reality aiming to occupy Narvik and the Swedish ore fields) - the Kriegsmarine wanted bases and Hitler wanted to secure the North Sea shipping routes.

Swedish public opinion never forgave the Germans the invasion of Denmark and Norway, and the response to the German "crusade against bolchevism" was less than lukewarm in Sweden, to German suprise and anger. Sweden refused to allow the Germans to open recruitment offices in Sweden, and when Germany threatened to end an agreed upon observation treaty, where 50-150 Swedish officers were to be allowed to observe on the Eastern Front, Sweden considered it cancelled and informed the officers that the positioning was no longer relevant.

Sweden will not join the axis and will not join Barbarossa, even with the Soviets next door - it might allow exile Finnish troops to operate from Åland, perhaps transferring the islands back to the exile government and allow the Germans to supply and equip the exile Finnish forces.

I'd fully expect the Finns with German support to be able to liberate most of Finland during 1941 through some landings - the local support and the pressing needs on other fronts, along with the difficult terrain will make it hard for the Soviets to hold Finland, IMHO.

The big question will be how Finland is treated post-war.

Åland being used like that against the Soviets likely ensures that Stalin demands it be given to his Finnish puppet state. And the Allies probably let him have it.

 

[raharris1973]

it has been commonly said that Hitler decided on doing Barbarossa upon seeing the poor performance of the Red Army

It is said, but it is BS. Such an observation or theory of causation is the classic example of the post hoc, ergo propter hoc logical fallacy. That is latin for "this happened after this, therefore it was because of this" which fails to separates coincidences from causes. Correlations, even well-timed ones in sequence, are not causation, at least not all by them themselves.

now while that is a simplification given he always intended to invade the USSR,

Correct. Which was a larger force rendering the quality of Red Army performance against little Finland irrelevant to the calculations of great power Germany.

would've a better performance made him invade earlier or later?

Not at all. Even a rapid Finnish capitulation to Soviet demands without fighting would have left Hitler's confidence undented. Even a rapid Soviet victory against a Finnish choice to resist militarily. Either of those results would have been much more in line with "reasonable expectations" held in Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, and, quite possibly, Helsinki, than what actually occurred. So rapid Soviet diplomatic or military victory would have impressed or surprised virtually no one, and would not be thought to have bearing on prospects of Soviet performance against a great power like Germany, especially since Germany had exceeded expectations by beating France so fast - a France which was militarily *more* respected than the USSR.

 

[raharris1973]

[1] It's not that Sickelschnitt is impossible here, but if planning resources are tied up in supporting Sweden, boosting Romania, arranging an invasion against Norwegian resistance, the chances of it being as well organised and as well-resourced as OTL are much reduced. And given the number of opportunities where it could have been slowed or completely fouled up OTL, that's bad news for Germany. Conversely, tying up allied planning resources with the Scandinavian problem is likely to be a benefit to the allies if it stops Gamelin from thinking about using an army best suited to defence on rash offensives like Breda.

I think this part is a little bit of an overoptimistic extrapolation.

The whole situation could indeed make Norway trickier for Germany, but Germany is *not* going to let northern worries let it take the eye off the ball in the Low Countries and France in spring 1940.

 

[Derek Pullem]

If the Finnish collapse is relatively early (e.g. Soviets fully exploit their armoured breakthrough at Summa and the Mannerheim Line is turned) then the likely outcome is a puppet Red Finland via the Finnish Democratic Republic. How stable this might be is anyone's guess.

Of course then In April 1940 the view from the Allied side is that there is little or no difference between USSR and Nazi Germany - both have annexed / puppeted sovereign states through military force. Russian military capabilities would also be regarded better (by everyone including Nazis and Stalin!)

The Allies could go full Operation Pike but its a futile gesture. Occupying Norway now looks untenable in the face of Soviet intervention as well as German.

Likely that Norway and Sweden end up neutrals but anti-Soviet and pro-German.

Britain and France get a few divisions back but Germany likely gets more. Little impact on France 1940.

Biggest change might be for Barbarossa - would a more successful Soviet Winter War mean that politically supporting them is untenable for Churchill (and later FDR)?

 

[Fratsup]

Not sure why the Soviets wouldn't just annex it since they did that to the Baltic anyways.

 

[Fleurs de Merde]

Not sure why the Soviets wouldn't just annex it since they did that to the Baltic anyways.

Don't need to, plus historic Bolshevik attachment to an independent/autonomous Finland, plus they had all the makings of a Finnish exile government ready to go. They can claim to just be reinstating the government that was thrown down by perfidious White Guards during the Finnish Civil War, which has a higher potential for internal Finnish legitimacy than direct rule from Moscow.

There's also a way stronger Finnish history of/claim to self-government relative to the Baltics - Finland had the Grand Duchy, while Latvia and Estonia at least had no history of independent statehood prior to 1918 and Lithuania had been under Russian rule since the 1700s and a part of Commonwealth before that.

Establishing the Finnish Democratic Republic has all the advantages of annexing Finland as an SSR without many of the downsides.

 

[DrakonFin]

Don't need to, plus historic Bolshevik attachment to an independent/autonomous Finland, plus they had all the makings of a Finnish exile government ready to go. They can claim to just be reinstating the government that was thrown down by perfidious White Guards during the Finnish Civil War, which has a higher potential for internal Finnish legitimacy than direct rule from Moscow.

There's also a way stronger Finnish history of/claim to self-government relative to the Baltics - Finland had the Grand Duchy, while Latvia and Estonia at least had no history of independent statehood prior to 1918 and Lithuania had been under Russian rule since the 1700s and a part of Commonwealth before that.

Establishing the Finnish Democratic Republic has all the advantages of annexing Finland as an SSR without many of the downsides.

Why would Red Finland remain independent when they have the chance to join the great, harmonious family of Soviet peoples, like the rest of the Baltic states did in 1940 IOTL? Much of the USSR's ostensible "attachment" for independent Finland comes from post facto rationalizations for why the USSR was unsuccessful in conquering Finland in the Winter War IOTL - they had to create a narrative for explaining away the failure, so they went with "we only wanted a small part of Finland anyway, and really supported the existence of an independent Finland, too".

Allowing the independence of the small nations on Russia's "Baltic fringe" was just tactics by Lenin back in c. 1917-1920, a crisis time expedient that could be (would be) fixed later. Basically, from Stalin's perspective, all the four Baltic nations were pretty much the same, small upstart countries that were by right a part of the Soviet sphere. Until 1939 and the Winter War, in which the Finns managed to surprise Stalin, and earned something like a grudging respect from him. The 1939-40 events caused in him also a mistaken view that the Western Allies had a specific soft spot for the Finns, and would practically support them in a war against the USSR. That is why Stalin made peace with the Finns in March 1940 even while the Red Army was finally winning, by and by - he thought that an Anglo-French intervention was imminent, due to faulty intel, which would have mired the USSR potentially in a general war against the capitalist powers.

As a result of the Winter War's outcome, Stalin started treating Finland as a special case, and this continued through, and was boosted by, what we call the Continuation War, where the Finns again surprised the Soviets with their tenacity. In the summer of 1944, they managed to stop a Soviet attack calculated to be strong enough to break the Finnish defences. In 1944-45 and beyond, it was the wartime experiences with Finland (and the apparent Western support for them) that caused the Finnish nation to be seen as a special case for the Soviet leadership. The fiction that they had been a special case for the Soviet leadership already in c. 1917-1939 was a purpose-built Soviet narrative created mainly after 1945 to explain away the USSR's failure to make Finland a part of the USSR or even a satellite People's Republic during WWII.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

I'd expect Finland to transfer the Åland island to Sweden in an emergency session of the parliament,

The USSR will not recognize this, nor the puppet regime it will establish. The Åland islands would not be defensible against Soviet forces. The easternmost islands are less than a kilometer off the mainland, in easy reach of Soviet artillery to support landings. (Also those islands are not part of Åland province.) The further islands are comparably close to the nearer islands, so Soviet forces could easily step from one to the next. Some islands are only a few hundred meters apart.

Nor do I see Germany successfully invading later. The Germans did not capture the islands off the Gulf of Riga till September/October 1941, a month after overrunning mainland Estonia.

 

[raharris1973]

Of course then In April 1940 the view from the Allied side is that there is little or no difference between USSR and Nazi Germany - both have annexed / puppeted sovereign states through military force.

The Allies could go full Operation Pike but its a futile gesture.

Biggest change might be for Barbarossa - would a more successful Soviet Winter War mean that politically supporting them is untenable for Churchill (and later FDR)?

These responses all assume *too much* that for greater Soviet gain, and aggression, there *must* be an equal and opposite anti-Soviet Western Allied reaction.

I say to the contrary, not at all.

Soviet aggression against Poland, the Baltics, Romania, did not cause permanent unforgivability of the USSR, nor prevent later anti-Nazi cooperation. The additional conquest of Finland should not.

A quicker, more thorough defeat of Finland, by virtue of being quicker, and more thorough, would be seen as tragic, but would have less time to inspire western sympathizers with Finnish "pluck", guts, courage, and plausibility of independence.

A quicker end of the war would cause Pike to be shelved at an earlier stage of its planning, since the rationale of helping the Finns would gone faster....too late.

All would be forgiven to the Russians once the Germans invade them, just like OTL. The lack of Soviet screwups in the Finnish war, would probably just slightly increase western estimates that the Soviets would be a survivable, and thus useful, anti-Nazi ally, instead of a likely doomed partner that nevertheless will be good for absorbing German attention for awhile while Britain mitigates its vulnerabilities at home and in the Empire.

I disagree with this conclusion as much as I disagree with the speculative conclusion offered multiple times that somehow, had Stalin attacked Hitler first, rather than the other way around, after the start of WWII between Germany and the west, the westerners would have been less sympathetic to the Soviets and provided less aid.

Key point: Churchill and Britain especially, but also FDR, and the military establishments of both Britain and America, were *not* disinterested observers, weighing carefully who was doing objectively "worse" things between Hitler and Stalin. Nor were they at several decades future remove, having experienced an anti-Russian, anti-Communist Cold War, and a revived 21st century anti-Russian Cold War; the British were at war with Nazi Germany, not the USSR, and they wanted to defeat the former, by hook or by crook. The USA, from the beginning of that war, wanted Britain to defeat the Germans. If the Soviets could be a tool for doing it, so be it. As Churchill said, "If Hitler invaded hell, I would give the Devil a favorable reference in the House of Commons." I have no question if some MP wasted the time to ask him the question, "But Winnie, what if Hell invaded Germany?" Churchill would have replied immediatelym " I would, of course, give the Devil a favorable reference in the House of Commons!".

 

[von Adler]

The USSR will not recognize this, nor the puppet regime it will establish. The Åland islands would not be defensible against Soviet forces. The easternmost islands are less than a kilometer off the mainland, in easy reach of Soviet artillery to support landings. (Also those islands are not part of Åland province.) The further islands are comparably close to the nearer islands, so Soviet forces could easily step from one to the next. Some islands are only a few hundred meters apart.

Nor do I see Germany successfully invading later. The Germans did not capture the islands off the Gulf of Riga till September/October 1941, a month after overrunning mainland Estonia.

The northern Soviet invasion forces were caught with maps of the Swedo-Finnish border and strict orders to not cross it.

The Swedish army was twice the size of the Finnish and much more heavily equipped with much, much, much more artillery, mortars, LMGs and AT guns, including the industrial base to supply their army with artillery ammunition, the lack of which was the foremost reason for the Finnish defeat.

The Swedish army and navy are capable of holding the Åland for a long time - and Sweden is not going to let the Soviets aim a pistol at central Sweden if they can prevent it.

 

[Derek Pullem]

These responses all assume *too much* that for greater Soviet gain, and aggression, there *must* be an equal and opposite anti-Soviet Western Allied reaction.

I say to the contrary, not at all.

Soviet aggression against Poland, the Baltics, Romania, did not cause permanent unforgivability of the USSR, nor prevent later anti-Nazi cooperation. The additional conquest of Finland should not.

A quicker, more thorough defeat of Finland, by virtue of being quicker, and more thorough, would be seen as tragic, but would have less time to inspire western sympathizers with Finnish "pluck", guts, courage, and plausibility of independence.

A quicker end of the war would cause Pike to be shelved at an earlier stage of its planning, since the rationale of helping the Finns would gone faster....too late.

All would be forgiven to the Russians once the Germans invade them, just like OTL. The lack of Soviet screwups in the Finnish war, would probably just slightly increase western estimates that the Soviets would be a survivable, and thus useful, anti-Nazi ally, instead of a likely doomed partner that nevertheless will be good for absorbing German attention for awhile while Britain mitigates its vulnerabilities at home and in the Empire.

I disagree with this conclusion as much as I disagree with the speculative conclusion offered multiple times that somehow, had Stalin attacked Hitler first, rather than the other way around, after the start of WWII between Germany and the west, the westerners would have been less sympathetic to the Soviets and provided less aid.

Key point: Churchill and Britain especially, but also FDR, and the military establishments of both Britain and America, were *not* disinterested observers, weighing carefully who was doing objectively "worse" things between Hitler and Stalin. Nor were they at several decades future remove, having experienced an anti-Russian, anti-Communist Cold War, and a revived 21st century anti-Russian Cold War; the British were at war with Nazi Germany, not the USSR, and they wanted to defeat the former, by hook or by crook. The USA, from the beginning of that war, wanted Britain to defeat the Germans. If the Soviets could be a tool for doing it, so be it. As Churchill said, "If Hitler invaded hell, I would give the Devil a favorable reference in the House of Commons." I have no question if some MP wasted the time to ask him the question, "But Winnie, what if Hell invaded Germany?" Churchill would have replied immediatelym " I would, of course, give the Devil a favorable reference in the House of Commons!".

Please address the points I made rather than points you would have like me to make.

I suggested that the Soviets would be regarded as equally bad to the Nazis in April 1940. Clearly after France, the BoB, North Africa and the Balkans, Germany is going to enemy #1.

I said myself that Operation Pike is a non-starter with an early fall of Finland - the butterfly is that likely UK and France may not risk the Norway campaign because the Soviets as a German de facto ally may intervene further in Scandinavia.

The straw man of linking my reply to the irrelevant issue of a hypothetical Soviert attack on Germany to discredit it is not appreciated

Finally it is likely that the Allies would support the Soviets to some extent - the question is would they go all in as IOTL given demonstrable Soviet intentions to reinstate control of all the old Czarist empire (and more). Even a small amount of hesitancy could have a big impact at critical times.

 

[Fratsup]

So I assume that the USSR would go farther into Europe considering they have a larger number of people and troops due to the Germans being more spread thin and not being able to push as far as OTL. I assume that Germany would overall be occupied by a larger degree than OTL with the Soviets potentially occupying Denmark as well.

If nothing else the Soviets would be better able to reach into the North Sea along with other areas of the world.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

It might not have that much more significant to the final outcome in Central Europe, honestly. The biggest changes would be to Finland itself and probably also Sweden during and after the war. Though the butterflies naturally become more and more unpredictable the further out you get.

 

[thaddeus]

One thing not yet mentioned here would be the changed naval situation in the Baltic Sea. Comparative to the OTL, the Soviets being in control of the Finnish mainland and being able to base naval vessels on the Finnish coast could maintain a relevant naval presence in the northern Baltic for longer than IOTL. This would likely necessitate for the Germans to send more naval assets to the Gulf of Finland, especially if and when the German advance reaches prewar Estonia on land.

If the Germans commit enough naval forces in the northern Baltic Sea, they might beat the Red Banner Baltic Fleet badly enough to mostly confine its remaining main strength in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. At that point, being in control of the western part of the Gulf, the Germans might also consider landings on the Finnish coast to open a new front there. There is also the exotic option of making an invasion across sea ice in the winter of 1941-42, historically a cold winter with strong ice in the northern Baltic Sea.

do not want to offer speculation that this scenario is favorable or advantageous for Germany however it might have forced a more limited war on them, their later Panther-Wotan Line about as far as they get, with a capture of Leningrad replacing Stalingrad (in the timeline.)

that is a scenario where there could be some German-Soviet agreement if unlikely.

(meaning a "liberation" of Finland in this also)